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Abstract
Memory forensics is an important tool in the hands of investigators. However, determining
if a computer is infected with malicious software is time consuming, even for experts. Tasks
that require manual reverse engineering of code or data structures create a significant bot-
tleneck in the investigative workflow. Through the application of emulation software and
symbolic execution, these strains have been greatly lessened, allowing for faster and more
thorough investigation. Furthermore, these efforts have reduced the barrier for forensic in-
vestigation, so that reasonable conclusions can be drawn even by non-expert investigators.
While previously Volatility had allowed for the detection of malicious hooks and injected
code with an insurmountably high false positive rate, the techniques presented in the work
have allowed for a much lower false positive rate automatically, and yield more detailed
information when manual analysis is required. The second contribution of this work is to
improve the reliability of memory forensic tools. As it currently stands, if some component
of the operating system or language runtime has been updated, the task of verifying that
these changes do not affect the correctness of investigative tools involves a large reverse
engineering effort, and significant domain knowledge, on the part of whoever maintains the
tool. Through modifications of the techniques used in the hook analysis, this burden can be
lessened or eliminated by comparing the last known functionality to the new functionality.





Memory forensics [75] is the process of examining the contents of a computer’s Random
Access Memory (RAM), sometimes called ‘main memory’ or simply ‘memory,’ to discover
some information about the activities on that computer at the time the memory dump was
taken. Reasons that an investigator might want this information vary, but commonly it is to
either find evidence of a crime committed by the user, or to discover the presence of malware
on the computer. Memory forensics is a subset of the field of digital forensics, and has seen an
increase in use in recent years as a response to such things as memory-only malware infecting
systems, such as many attacks using Powershell Empire [107], or criminals using cloud-based
communications and file storage, which leave no evidence on disk. By themselves, disk or
network forensics have never given a complete picture, but developments such as these have
made it so that by ignoring memory forensics you may well lose all artifacts relevant to an
investigation and not even know it. However, the tools used in memory forensics are still
fairly young, and have much room for improvement. The focus of this work is to push the
boundaries of what can be accomplished by tools such as Volatility [128] so that investigations
can be completed more quickly, accurately, and in greater depth.
1.1.1 Volatility
The Volatility memory forensics framework, mentioned in the previous section, is the most
widely used memory forensics framework. Due to its ease of use, open source nature, and
plugin-based ecosystem, it is the only memory forensics tool that will be discussed in this
work, and is the only one used for the research presented here. As such, it merits a brief
introduction. Volatility is used to analyze memory images, but does not provide functional-
ity to collect them. As mentioned, Volatility is an open source tool hosted on Github, and
provides functionality based on which plugins are installed. Plugins provided by core devel-
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opers make up most of capabilities provided by Volatility, but many user-made plugins are
also included on the Github repository. Additionally, users can develop their own plugins for
personal use, share them with the community, or even work with the core developers to get
the plugins added to the standard Volatility installation. Currently, Volatility can analyze
memory dumps of all popular versions of the Windows and OSX operating systems, as well
as most popular Linux distributions, but due to its plugin-based nature, not all of the func-
tionality available to one operating system version will be available to another. In the scope
of this work, most of the focus will be on Windows analysis unless otherwise specified. This
choice was made due to the relative popularity of Windows for both consumer and enterprise
use as well as the number of compatible and notable malware that target Windows systems.
1.1.2 As Program Analysis
When discussing program analysis methods, people generally talk about two general strate-
gies or methodologies: static analysis and dynamic analysis. Static analysis [109, 27] covers
things such as reading through a program’s source code, or perhaps the disassembly of some
program’s binary. More generally, static analysis describes methods of analysis that aim to
study a program without actually executing code. Dynamic analysis includes taint anal-
ysis [39], sandboxing [138], or otherwise observing the behavior of some code by running
it. There are relative strengths and weaknesses to both approaches. Static analysis can
be significantly more time consuming, and code obfuscation or encryption can render these
methods effectively impossible, where something as simple as a three hour sleep at the begin-
ning of some process can be enough to convince a dynamic analyst that the code did not run
correctly. On the other hand, static analysis gives a very complete picture of the structure
of a program, and does not risk a malware infection on the analyst’s own machine, while
dynamic analysis can quickly reveal the most relevant behaviors of some code, no matter
how unreadable it was made to be. As will be covered later, while static and dynamic are
sometimes thought of as "the two" forms of analysis, this is not strictly true. It is, however,
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a useful simplification in many situations. When looked at this way, analysis of a memory
image occupies kind of a fused space of these broad domains. In many cases, the raw code
of some program is, indeed, present in memory, and can be understood as a static piece of
code. Simultaneously, because the code was actually being run, and because the view that
memory forensics gives includes operating system structures and behaviors, an investigator
can get information about how the program behaves when run. For instance, network con-
nections initialized by the process, Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs or dlls) loaded, and
other information that might be hard, or impossible, to deduce from simply reading code is
readily available. Some malware can detect the presence of virtualization software, debug-
gers, and other staples of various dynamic analysis toolkits [42, 25]. When analyzed inside
of a memory image, however, one can observe the "true" behavior of the malware since it
has already been executed in an environment without instrumentation. Furthermore, since
it is no longer running it cannot actively thwart attempts at observation. This is not to say
that the analysis of a memory image solves all problems facing other analysis methods, or
retains their relative strengths. Outside the case of virtual machines, acquiring a memory
image is a non-trivial and error-prone process [9, 129, 52, 50]. When trying to analyze the
image of a virtual machine, however, you still have to contend with the same anti-analysis
techniques that make dynamic analysis difficult. Additionally, the code present in memory
is still a binary at best, and in some cases may not even be entirely present in memory.
In summary, program analysis through analysis of a memory image can provide additional
insights or benefits that other techniques cannot, but it is not a catch-all. However, in the
case of forensic investigations there may not be an additional option, as a program binary
may not be available on non-volatile storage.
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1.2 Hooks
A large amount of this research involves the analysis of hooks installed on a system. Broadly,
the research is focused on two types of hooks, function hooks (or API hooks) and event hooks.
Function hooks involve replacing one function, say f_orig, with another, say f_hooked, so
that when f_orig is called, f_hooked is executed instead. While this may appear a solely
malicious process, legitimate uses include hooking your own code for backwards compatibil-
ity or system monitoring, for example by antivirus software. On the other hand, malware
may install API hooks in order to maliciously alter the behavior of some program or, more
commonly, to spy on the user. In this case, f_hooked eventually returns control to f_orig,
but since it executes first, and with the same parameters, it can get information about user
behavior. For example, by hooking networking functions, malware might be able to deter-
mine what websites a user is visiting, or if it takes a more active role, it could redirect the
user to a malicious website. Event hooks, on the other hand, make use of hooking func-
tionality provided by the operating system itself to install the hooks. Instead of overwriting
code or data somewhere, installing an event hook means adding the hook to a queue of other
hooks on the system, all listening for a specific type of event. For instance, one could install
hooks that execute whenever a key is pressed, whenever a USB device is inserted, or a host
of other things. Once again there are both legitimate and malicious uses for this type of
hook, which is why the operating system provides functionality to install them. For example,
any program that relies on hot-keys might install a hook that fires on key presses, while a
keylogger (malicious or otherwise) might install a similar hook to record that key press. The




Inline or trampoline hooks are a simple type of API hook, where some part of the original
function, usually at the very beginning is overwritten with instructions that alter the control
flow and redirect execution to the hook [13]. This can be done with a simple jmp <offset>,
but other combinations of instructions can work as well (eg, push <address>; ret). Some-
times, if a function expects to be hooked frequently, it may include several nop instructions at
the beginning, allowing space for the overwrite. While inline hooks are simple to understand
and implement, detection is fairly easy as well. When hooking a function, you want to gain
control at the earliest opportunity, since the idea is to implement your function instead of,
or before, the other function. Because of this, inline hooks typically need to be inserted in
the first few instructions of the target function, meaning there is a fairly conspicuous control
flow change in the first handful of bytes. While changing up the instructions used to divert
execution might fool simple tools that scan for ret and the like, any investigator or more
robust tool will fairly easily detect this sort of control flow change. Indeed, this is how the
Volatility api_hooks plugin detects inline hooks, which will come up in a later chapter.
1.2.2 IAT and EAT
Various executable formats include built-in methods for programs to import and export
functions without code being duplicated in memory or invoking the loader each time you
want to locate a function. On Windows systems, the PE format makes use of the Import
Address Table and Export Address Table (IAT and EAT) [105], which are tables that in the
former case store addresses of functions some program wants to import, and in the latter case
store addresses of functions that the program (a library, perhaps) wants to export. Similar
structures are used on Linux systems, for ELF files, and they are named the Procedure
Linkage Table and Global Offset Table (PLT and GOT)[132]. In any case, when a program
makes reference to such a function, the lookup is done in the table instead of making use
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of the loader to find it. These tables are, however, a prime target for API hooks, because
simply overwriting an address in the table hooks the function whose address was stored there.
Detecting these hooks is more involved than detecting inline hooks. For instance, Volatility
reports functions as hooked if an address in the IAT or EAT points outside of the module
that owns that function, unless it matches against a list of known-redirected functions [133].
Figure 1.1 The function prototype of SetWindowsHookEx.
1.2.3 SetWindowsHookEx
SetWindowsHookEx [91] is a function exported by the Windows API which installs a given
hook for some given event type. The function prototype is given in Figure 1.1. Using this
function, programs can add a hook to a chain of hooks to be called, sequentially, once some
event specified by the idHook parameter happens. The function to be executed when this
happens is specified by lpfn, and the module in which this function is located is specified by
hmod. Finally, dwThreadId is the id of the thread to be hooked, or zero to hook all threads.
Use of this function by malware to install userland hooks has been very popular historically,
and still is [49, 127, 54]. This is because other methods of hooking create significant noise
on the system, require code injection into other processes, and require polling of keystrokes,
which may result in missed keystrokes. The use of code injection and privilege modification
by other hooking methods inherently raises suspicions, and at the very least uses more than
one system call, while SetWindowsHookEx is just one function call, and everything else is
handled by the operating system. Since hooks installed this way use a Windows API call, the
system must keep track of them somehow. Indeed, Windows keeps track of all information
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associated with each hook, and keeps track of each hook associated with each active thread
on each desktop [75]. Because of this Volatility can enumerate all message hooks present on
a system, as well as their backing modules, which function is called, and which threads they
affect.
1.3 Code Injection
Another technique used by malware for an array of malicious behaviors is code injection.
Code injection is a broad term for any mechanism by which one process can cause code to be
written to, and executed inside of another, victim, process. There are four main techniques
malware uses to accomplish this, outlined in the next few sections. All of this information
is covered in The Art of Memory Forensics [75], but will be included briefly here for clarity
and completeness.
1.3.1 Remote DLL Injection
The first technique discussed is called remote DLL injection. Remote here does not indicate
that the injection is being done remotely with respect to the computer being infected, but
rather remote with respect to the process being victimized. Remote DLL injection happens
when a malicious process writes the path, on disk, of some malicious DLL on disk into the
memory of the victim process. Then, the malicious process creates a new thread inside the
victim process, and has it call LoadLibrary, passing in the malicious DLL as a parameter.
Since the path to this DLL is indeed in the victim processes memory, it is loaded without
issue, and now malicious code is executing inside the victim process’s memory. Since this
technique uses legitimate Windows APIs to load a DLL that is actually on disk, there are
few forensic artifacts left behind by this method, making it difficult to detect. This issue is
examined further in Section 2.4.
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1.3.2 Remote Code Injection
This technique is more direct than the previous. Instead of writing a DLL’s path into the
victim process’s memory and calling LoadLibrary, in this case the malicious code allocates
memory with read, write, and execute permissions inside of the victim process. Then,
malicious code is written directly into that executable page, and a thread is created which
begins its execution at the first address containing malicious code. As is the case with the
next two methods, this is a noisy endeavor which leaves behind one or more pages of memory
which are marked readable, writable, and executable (RWX), a telltale sign that something
is amiss.
1.3.3 Reflective DLL Injection
This technique combines elements of the previous two. Like remote code injection, nothing
needs to exist on disk to back the memory being written, but instead of some shellcode
being written into memory, it is an entire, well-formed DLL. The reason for not having
a DLL backing this process on disk is twofold. First, writing to disk leaves behind addi-
tional artifacts which can be discovered through other types of analysis. Secondly, not using
LoadLibrary, which requires a file on disk, means that none of the operating system data
structures updated when it is called are touched or created, and so no "official" record of the
DLL loading exists. However, as with the previous technique, a memory region with RWX
permission must be allocated in the victim process.
1.3.4 Process Hollowing
The last technique differs somewhat significantly from the previous three. In process hol-
lowing, instead of an existing process being victimized to host some malicious elements,
a legitimate process is started by the malware, but execution is not started immediately.
Instead, the malware first frees all the memory in the newly created victim, then replaces
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it with the entirety of the malware, and then the thread executes, beginning now at the
malicious code. The effect is that all of the data structures that track process creation hold
legitimate process information, but the malware is in fact executing. In order to "replace"
the original memory with the malware, however, requires the newly allocated memory to be
RWX, so that after allocation the malware body can be written in, and then executed. It
shares this similarity with the previous two methods.
1.4 Concrete and Symbolic Execution
As mentioned in section 1.1.2, one can analyze code dynamically in order to study its be-
havior. One method is to simply execute it and let it run, given the code is in an executable
format. Alternatively, working from the static code, be it a disassembly or true source code,
one can emulate the execution of the code in a virtual environment. Emulation is frequently
used in malware analysis and other security-related analysis situations [8, 11, 63, 7, 106,
137]. One tool for emulation is the Unicorn Engine [108], an emulator for several different
processors. Benefits of emulating code in this way include the ability to instrument it as
much as necessary, assurance that your real system will not be harmed by the code you are
executing, and the ability to quickly check different execution paths of the code through
different variable assignments. This last point, analyzing the program by tracing execution
down different paths by supplying different inputs, is called concrete execution. This is par-
ticularly powerful because simply executing the code as normal may only drive execution
down one particular path in the program, but if you have a way to supply multiple, different
inputs, various paths can be explored, giving better information about the true behavior of
the code being analyzed. One such way to generate this input is through a fuzzer [101, 139],
a program that automatically generates different inputs to some given program to try and
discover inputs that reach some desired state, usually a crash.
Another method of exploring different code paths involves the use of a technique from
9
Figure 1.2 Example code.
formal program verification methods, called symbolic execution. While concrete execution
might initialize variables to some given, concrete, state, symbolic execution initializes them
to a symbolic value. You can think about a symbolic value much like a variable in algebra:
it has no value associated with it, but instead has ranges of values that it can or cannot
take. In the case of symbolic execution, these ranges are specified in the form of constraints
which are placed on the path that the program has followed. Take the code in Figure 1.2 as
an example. Since there is no way to know what parameters f is passed, x and y would be
initialized to symbolic values, say Vx and Vy. The next step of the execution hits a branch,
conditional on the value of x, so two execution paths are explored, one with the constraint
Vx <= 10 and one with Vx > 10. The first case returns 1 immediately, ending execution, so
it can be seen that in cases when param1 is less than or equal to 10, the function f returns
1. The second branch, however, branches again, this time placing Vx < Vy in the positive
branch, and Vx > Vy in the negative branch. The execution continues on this way until there
is nothing left to execute. The end result of this process is that every state of the program
is explored, and a set of conditions that must be met to reach those states are generated.
When reaching a branch in the program, symbolic execution makes use of a constraint solver
[51] on each path constraint to make sure that the path can actually be reached, so time is
not wasted exploring infeasible execution states.
Concrete and symbolic execution can be applied together, in a process known as concolic
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execution (conc-rete and symb-olic) [113]. Concolic execution initializes input variables to
arbitrary, concrete values, but treats all others as symbolic. Additionally, it maintains sym-
bolic state information as well as path constraint information. Because of this, execution
proceeds as normal concrete execution down some path. When a branch is reached, then,
there is one canonical path that will be taken based on the concrete input variables. Since
path constraints are maintained, however, a constraint solver can be applied to find alterna-
tive concrete input values that, if provided as input, would result in the other path in the
branch being taken. And so, the concolic execution kicks off again with these new values and
explores the previously unexplored path, repeating until no new paths are available. The
end result of this whole process is that you are left with concrete input values to the target
program which can cause execution down every program path.
1.4.1 The Unicorn Engine
As mentioned in the previous section, the Unicorn Engine (or Unicorn) allows for emulation
of code on different processor architectures. This work relies on Unicorn to implement
HookTracer, and so it will be discussed briefly. Unicorn is based off of another popular
emulator, QEMU [10], which is a whole system emulator, a favorite for quickly emulating
guest operating systems such as Raspbian [43], and older video game consoles. Unicorn
cuts away much of the meat of QEMU, leaving just a light-weight processor emulator. This
means that the implementation of everything else is left to the user, including setting up
virtual memory, the stack, and any system calls you want to emulate. Because of this,
though, Unicorn is very useful for emulating code that was disassembled from a binary or
binary data pulled from a memory image. Unicorn also provides helpful bindings in different
languages that allow ad hoc execution environments to be set up as part of another program.
In the case of HookTracer, Unicorn is integrated into a Volatility plugin in order to analyze
hooks detected by Volatility.
11
1.4.2 angr
This work also made use of angr [116, 121, 115], a binary analysis platform with many
different features and applications. In particular, angr was used for its symbolic and concolic
execution capabilities in order to get more robust information about the behavior of code.
Unicorn could have been used for this as well, but that would have required building an
entire symbolic execution engine on top of it, which is in part what angr is already. Due to
compatibility issues in Python versions, angr could not be integrated directly into a Volatility





The first portion of research conducted for this work produced a framework called Hook-
Tracer. HookTracer is an API for Volatility plugins to use which allows them to make use of
the Unicorn emulator mentioned in 1.3.1. HookTracer takes care of the subtle work of setting
up the stack and providing callbacks for use during emulation, allowing plugins that want to
emulate code from memory to be developed quickly and effectively. The research presented
in this chapter relied on HookTracer for the development of two plugins, hooktracer and
hooktracer_messagehooks, for analyzing API and message hooks respectively, and a third
for analyzing injected code, iodine. To avoid confusion, the API developed is HookTracer,
capitalized ‘H’ and ‘T’, while the plugin is hooktracer, all lowercase and italicized.
While Volatility’s apihooks andmessagehooks plugins are good at discovering the presence
of hooks in an image, the sheer number of hooks found on known-clean images of modern
operating systems means that determining the presence of a malware infection is both time
consuming and tedious, as an investigator must manually examine and reverse engineer
the behavior of each hook to decide if it is malicious or not. The same is true for the
potentially injected code detected by the malfind plugin. Table 2.1 lists the number of
API hooks detected on a clean installation of each of the listed operating systems. This
data was collected by installing the 32-bit version of the OS on a virtual machine through
VMWare Fusion. The default user was logged in, and then the default web browser was
launched, Internet Explorer in some cases and Microsoft Edge in others. The VM was then
Sections 2.1 - 2.3 of this chapter contain work published in A. Case, R. Maggio, M. Firoz-Ul-Amin,
M. Jalalzai, A. Ali-Gombe, M. Sun, G. G. RichardIII, "Hooktracer: Automatic Detection and Analysis of
Keystroke Loggers Using MemoryForensics", Computers and Security, vol. 96, 2020., and in A. Case, M
Jalalzai, M Firoz-Ul-Amin, R. Maggio, A. Ali-Gombe, M. Sun, G. G. RichardIII, "HookTracer: A System
for Automated and Accessible API Hooks Analysis," Proceed-ings of the 2019 Digital Forensics Research
Conference (DFRWS), July 2019, Portland, OR.
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suspended, generating vmem and vmss files. These files were then fed into Volatility, and
the apihooks plugin was run to enumerate all hooks present. While an investigator might be
able to manually check thirty six hooks in a reasonable amount of time, checking 300, or 600
hooks, much less 32,000, is entirely infeasible for even the most experienced reverse engineer.
HookTracer allows for the automated analysis of each hook found, with relevant information
output for each one, so that investigators can simply run the plugin and get the high-level
behavioral information required to make decisions about which hooks are malicious. The
following sections will cover the work produced using hooktracer, hooktracer_messagehooks,
and iodine, respectively.
Table 2.1 Number of API Hooks by Operating System







The input to hooktracer is the output of the Volatility plugin apihooks as a JSON file.
apihooks detects and gathers the API Hooks from the sample as described in Sections 1.2.1
and 1.2.2. Since Volatility is a command line tool, the default output from each plugin is
usually directly to the terminal, but there are built in options to have the output as one of
several different standard formats and saved to a file. In this case, JSON was decided to be
the most useful, as the Python JSON library makes storing output as a data structure and
then retrieving the data with the same structure, or a similarly useful one, incredibly easy.
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Algorithm 1: Hooktracer
1 ApiHookSet← API hooks from Volatility’s apihooks
2 foreach hook in ApiHookSet do
3 BasicBlocks← Emulate(hook)
4 CodeMemRegs← Map(BasicBlocks)




Figure 2.1 An inline/trampoline hook, as displayed by apihooks.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of apihooks’ command line output for a single inline hook.
2.2.2 Emulation
With data about the hook and victim in hand, emulation can proceed. For this emulation to
yield any valuable information, callbacks need to be registered for a variety of occurrences.
At the time this research was conducted, HookTracer had callbacks for the following events:
• New instruction reached
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• New basic block reached
• Memory reads and writes
• Memory accesses (read, write, or execute) to invalid or unmapped memory regions
After the callbacks are registered, a virtual address space is initialized, the first part of which
is the stack. Since the stack needs to be maintained inside of the same virtual address space
that the rest of the emulation is happening in, its addresses need to be picked carefully so
that nothing the code being emulated does overwrites stack data. To this end, HookTracer
implements its stack in a memory region reserved for the kernel on Windows systems. This
region is chosen because userland code can never access kernel ranges, so the stack will
be safe from any operations executed. An additional consideration related to the stack is
that finding a way to determine when the hook is finished executing. Since the idea is to
execute the whole hook, execution cannot be stopped at a predetermined depth, but similarly
executing code unrelated to the hook yields incorrect results, or unbounded execution. To
address this, the read and write callbacks keep special track of the base address of the stack.
Since the stack is initialized with no data, a flag is set False, marking the stack empty. The
memory write callback includes special handling so that when the stack base is written to
the flag is set to True, meaning that the code being emulated resulted in something being
added to the stack, for instance because of a function call. When the last piece of data is
popped off of the stack, the flag is set back to False, and so on. The memory read callback
includes special handling so that when the stack base is read while the flag is set to False, the
emulation terminates. This is because when the hook executes its final ret to return control
back to the calling function, the stack will be completely empty because all subroutines
will have finished executing, and the ret will point to the base, because in a real execution
environment the base we set up would contain the address of the original function that called
the hook.
Now that the emulation environment is set up, emulation can begin. This starts at the
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initial address of the hook, provided by the input file. Since the virtual address space is
initialized empty, no matter what the address is, it will trigger a callback set to handle an
access to invalid memory. This callback makes sure that the address is valid in the address
space of the process being analyzed, and reads in a block of memory starting at that address
memory image, if it exists. If it does, the data is copied into the emulated address space and
emulation continues. This callback is also triggered when control is passed to an unmapped
region in the emulated address space. This way, the emulated address space is filled in on
demand as emulation proceeds. This is important since the code being emulated is only kept
track of by its starting address, it is impossible to know ahead of time exactly what memory
will be accessed. When the page requested is not resident in the memory image, the plugin
can attempt to help the emulation along with behavior primarily focused on allowing the
hook to execute for as long as possible. In the case of writes, an empty page is mapped into
the emulated address space at the address requested, and the write continues. For a call
to a non-resident page, the callback maps in a page at that address filled with the opcodes
for mov eax, 0; ret, so the hook believes that whatever function it called returned 0 and
behaves accordingly, instead of simply halting emulation.
2.2.3 Gathering Basic Blocks
The callback registered to trigger on new basic blocks is what allows for most of the high-
level analysis to be conducted. Each time the callback is triggered for a particular hook,
the starting address of the block is recorded. After emulation terminates, these blocks are
checked, using Volatility, against the memory image to find what memory region contains
them. The resulting list of memory regions, in the order they were reached, gives high-level
data about the execution, allowing for the possibility of a variety of analyses.
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2.2.4 Analysis
The most basic analysis allowed for by hooktracer is reasoning about memory regions and
permissions. Figure 2.2 shows a snippet of the output from hooktracer when run against
a memory image infected with the Coreflood [67] malware. The first information displayed
comes directly from apihooks, that a process, IEXPLORER.EXE with PID 2044, has a hook
installed on GetMessageA in the DLL user32.dll. All of the information presented after this,
a list of triples containing a set of permissions, the memory region, and the number of basic
blocks executed in that region consecutively, was generated by hooktracer. The memory
regions listed were pulled from a kernel data structure called a Virtual Address Descriptor
(VAD), which means it cannot have been overwritten by a userland process attempting to
hide [6]. In this example we see that control is first redirected to a non-file-backed memory
region starting at the address 0x7ff80000, which is marked readable, writable, and executable.
This should immediately raise alarms for investigators, as legitimate code would normally
be backed by a file on disk instead of executing directly from memory. Additionally, a
memory region being readable, writable, and executable (RWX) is bad practice, and as such
is usually the result of malware changing permissions so that it can inject code into memory
directly and then execute it. Cysinfo [1] details how DLLs loaded legitimately will have the
permissions PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY, while hollowed processes will usually have
something else, most commonly PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE. After code executes in
these non-file-backed regions, control is passed to the legitimate handlers for the request,
then to the malicious code, back to legitimate software, and finally back to the malicious
code again.
A second piece of malware, TDSS [94], was examined with hooktracer, and a snippet
of that output is presented in Figure 2.3. In this case, the malware starts executing in a
malicious region located at 0x270000, then jumps to yet another malicious region located
at 0x260000. From this an investigator can identify two separate regions hosting suspicious
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Figure 2.2 hooktracer output for Coreflood malware.
code without having to reverse engineer anything.
Figure 2.3 hooktracer output for TDSS malware.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, antivirus software makes extensive use of API hooks to
monitor system behavior. Unfortunately, this compounds the problem of false positives.
Taking the clean Windows 7 install used for the data in table 2.1 and installing a free edition
of AVG Anti-Virus [110] increased the number of hooks from 296 to 1,625. Clearly this is
problematic for investigators, even more so because the hooks installed by antivirus software
frequently use the same tricks employed by malware. For example, based on the previous
two malware examples one might assume that any execution from a non-file-backed region
with read, write, and execute permissions is malicious. While this is often the case, consider
the results of running hooktracer on the clean Windows 7 image with AVG Free Edition,
shown in Figure 2.4. Just like the malware seen previously, AVG executes the first part
of its hook from a non-file-backed RWX memory region before jumping into several DLLs
owned by AVG. Based on the output of hooktracer, then, an investigator can perhaps make
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the decision to ignore hooks such as this one for now, since they are likely the result of well
known anti-virus software, and instead focus efforts elsewhere. Again, this is accomplished
with no reverse engineering on the part of the investigator.
Figure 2.4 AVG API hook detected by hooktracer.
While hooktracer does significantly lessen the load on investigators, turning thousands
of reverse engineering efforts into the same amount of processed output still leaves a lot on
their plate. To address this, hooktracer supports the use of three types of filters. The first
type, called an All Containing filter, filters out any output where all of the memory regions
visited match a given file or directory. For instance, filtering out all the hooks where every
basic block was executed inside the System32 directory was found to reduce the number of
hooks outputted on the clean Windows 10 image used in Table 2.1 from 32,458 to 178. This
can be done because on modern Windows systems, the DLLs in the System32 directory are
protected from modification. Furthermore, analyzing these remaining 178 hooks revealed an
additional pattern: many of the remaining hooks execute exclusively in directories involving
the Visual C++ runtime system and Microsoft Office’s One Drive, as shown in Figure 2.5
and Figure 2.6. By adding All Containing filters for these directories as well, the number of
outputted hooks dropped further from 178 to zero.
A second filter type, the Any Containing filter, is a kind of complement to the first. An
Any Containing filter filters out all outputs where the path of any memory region matches a
file or directory given. This is useful in cases like the AVG example above. If an investigator
decides she does not want to see any hooks related to antivirus, she can supply an Any
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Figure 2.5 An unfiltered API hook related to use of the vcruntime140_app.dll in
the WindowsApps folder.
Figure 2.6 An unfiltered API hook due to use of Microsoft’s OneDrive components.
Containing filter to make it so. As shown in Figure 2.4, all of the hooks inserted by AVG are
in the \ProgramFiles\AVG\Antivirus directory. Testing this exact filter, along with the
previously described All Containing filter, on the Windows 7 VM with AVG Free Edition
installed reduced the number of displayed hooks from 1,625 to 175, lower than the 296 from
before AVG was installed.
The last filter type, Grouping, causes hooktracer to only output hooks matching a specific
pattern. The power of this capability can be demonstrated through tests on the infamous
Zeus malware [59, 134]. The malware was installed on the previously clean Windows 7
system, without AVG installed. Because Zeus attempts to hook 41 functions in every process
it can access, this brought the total number of API hooks up to 480 from 296. Without any
filters on, many of the hooks follow a similar pattern, shown in Figure 2.7. This is the
output of hooktracer for one hook, with the permissions section removed for readability. The
control moves from one suspicious region to another, then into a legitimate region owned by
System32, and then finally back to the first region. All of the hooks installed by Zeus follow
this pattern, but with different numbers of DLLs in System32 being used, and different
addresses on the anonymous memory regions, due to different memory layouts for different
processes. A grouping of hooks that look like this can be generated by hooktracer’s grouping
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functionality. This filter is generated by specifying a function name and PID of the hook to
serve as a template as parameters to hooktracer. hooktracer then records, in order, the first
three memory regions executed by the hook, making note of the size (not the addresses) of
the anonymous regions and the full path of the file-backed regions. This record is saved,
and if the investigator runs hooktracer again, supplying the record, only hooked functions
that match the record are displayed. Figure 2.8 shows the (truncated) result of this process.
By specifying one function to serve as an example, all of the hooks, and only the hooks,
generated by Zeus are displayed. An additional benefit to this type of grouping is that the
record is saved to disk, meaning it can be used in future investigations to quickly check
for Zeus infections. An investigator can then generate a hook signature for each type of
malware she comes across and incorporate them into her automated workflow or share them
with others, allowing her knowledge and experience to propagate efficiently.
Figure 2.7 hooktracer output for a Zeus API hook.
2.2.5 Limitations
While hooktracer does alleviate much of the reverse engineering efforts previously required
of investigators, it does not, by itself, give any indication about the legitimacy of a certain
hook. Furthermore, while the filters are a useful tool, filtering is a fairly brittle process.
For instance, if malware makes an effort to specifically infect antivirus software it may get
caught in filters because it looks legitimate. Lastly, only seeing the memory regions visited
and not the specific behavior of the hook can make it hard to make determinations about
hooks that make it past any filters. Techniques developed for use in plugins developed after
hooktracer, presented in the following sections, address this last issue by allowing for the
22
Figure 2.8 hooktracer grouping Zeus’ API hooks.
capture of specific API or system calls found during emulation.
2.3 hooktracer_messagehooks
The second plugin, hooktracer_messagehooks acts on the output of the messagehooks plu-
gin, and thus the behavior of message hooks on a system instead of API hooks. This
required the development of new functionality for HookTracer in the form of callbacks
for different behaviors, as well as additional input handling and post-processing. Specifi-
cally, hooktracer_messagehooks is designed to target keylogging malware, the main abuser
of SetWindowsHookEx, but functionality could be expanded to handle message hooks in-
stalled for other malicious reasons. In particular, the number of instructions which need to
be executed to emulate message hook behavior greatly exceeds what was required for API




Like hooktracer, hooktracer_messagehooks relies on the output of another Volatility plugin
to function, messagehooks. The usage and basic principles behind messagehooks is described
in Section 1.2.3, and Figure 2.9 shows a snippet of this output for a global hook detected on
a system, while Figure 2.10 shows the same hook from the local context of a specific thread.
Figure 2.9 shows that the hook is global, indicated by the line where the thread is listed as
"<any>." This means that the hook is installed on any thread active on the desktop logon
session indicated in the "ihmod" line. In this case, 0 means that the hook is active in the
Default desktop. The hook listens for WH_CALLWNDPROC messages, indicated by the "filters"
line, and the function to be executed is located at offset 0x1160 in C:\Windows\system32\
wls0wndh.dll, specified next to "Procedure" and "Module," respectively. Figure 2.10 shows
further that this hook is active in thread 3180, in the process spoolsv with PID 1360. One
block such as this is reported by messagehooks for each thread running on the desktop, since
the hook requested to be active in all threads. Again, as with hooktracer, the output from
messagehooks needs to be in the form of a JSON file.
Figure 2.9 A global message hook as displayed by messagehooks.
2.3.2 HookTracer Augmentations
hooktracer_messagehooks, like hooktracer, makes use of the HookTracer API for emulation.
As such, much of the basic set up is taken care of as described in Section 2.2.2. For message
hook emulation to be effective, though, more functionality needed to be added to HookTracer.
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Figure 2.10 A local message hook as displayed by messagehooks.
Since message hooks rely more heavily on the operating system to provide services and access
to resources than API hooks, in general, simply executing the code without the operating
system to support it does not get very far. Therefore, HookTracer was augmented with
implementations of Windows APIs that will work in the virtual environment. The main
behaviors targeted for implementation were:
• Lock access - Since no other processes or threads are active within the emulated envi-
ronment, the state of a lock is "stuck" at its value at the time of memory capture
• Memory region allocations - Handling of memory region allocation requests, such as
through the VirtualAlloc API, requires in-kernel code that is not supported by the
emulator
• Debugging APIs - These APIs allow reading and writing memory of other processes,
none of which are present within the emulated environment
In order to make sure calls to these API functions are properly handled, before emulation
is attempted hooktracer_messagehooks scans the hook process for all loaded modules and
records the address of all functions exported by these modules. When one of these functions
matches one implemented in HookTracer, any calls to these functions are instead directed
to the HookTracer version.
Aside from differences in operating system usage, API hooks and message hooks generally
behave differently. API hooks typically record or manipulate parameters being passed to
whatever function they hook, while message hooks typically have more complex behavior,
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such as filesystem, registry, or network activity. Activities in these domains can be used for
persistence, propagation of infection, stealing data, or spying, so it is important HookTracer
is able to monitor them. Even though a goal of this work is detection of malware that does
not interact with the filesystem, it would be negligent to ignore such artifacts when they
exist.
In order to monitor filesystem activity, HookTracer was expanded to maintain an internal
table of handles, unique identifiers that HookTracer creates and passes back to calls such
as OpenFile. On reads and writes to a specific handle, HookTracer makes use of Volatility
[133] to attempt to read a cached version of the file in memory. In the case that the file
is not in memory, a buffer of null bytes is returned instead. Attempted writes to a file are
isntead directed to a file that shadows the original, with new data overlayed on the original
data. Lastly, a close operation causes HookTracer to drop the handle from its internal table.
Additionally, calls to functions that return file metadata, such as ZwQueryInformationFile
[93], are commonly used and so are partially implemented by HookTracer such that most
common uses of the function are supported. Similarly, GetFileSize is implemented by
returning the size of the file if it is found cached in memory, or else 256KB is returned.
Similar to the file system, accesses to the registry also need to be handled, and as before,
HookTracer maintains a virtual registry tree containing keys and values pulled from memory
when possible [133] or generated when needed. This again allows the malware to be given as
much real data as possible to act on, which in turn gives hooktracer_messagehooks correct
information about the malware’s malicious behavior.
A common feature of malware, especially memory-only malware, is reliance on network-
ing. In some cases, malware might not execute at all if it cannot connect to some website
or server. To this end, HookTracer provides as much fake network connectivity as possible.
This is a known problem in the security community, especially for attempts at dynamic
analysis. With malware being, well, malicious, it becomes very risky to actually give an
infected system access to a network and so malware analysis sandboxes are isolated. To
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get around this, projects such as FakeNet [53] and its successor, FakeNet-NG [41], provide
fake DNS and HTTP services to whatever sandbox an investigator connects them to. This
way, malware executing in the sandbox believes it actually can connect to the Internet and
executes normally. Unfortunately, HookTracer cannot use these tools directly, but instead
makes use of similar techniques to fake network activity and connectivity. For instance,
DNS resolution attempts cause HookTracer to return Google’s public IP address. Calls to
functions that perform HTTP requests cause HookTracer to generate a reply that matches
the requested protocol and file type. Calls that expect raw data to be returned cause Hook-
Tracer to generate the English alphabet, repeating to match the expected message length.
Lastly, calls that expect no data but attempt to interact with network devices, such as bind,
accept, and socket, simply cause a return of a value that indicates success.
Returning fake data is a method which has come up a few times now, and which is used
for several other functions where trying to implement the function does not, or may not
always, work. To successfully fake returned data, the register holding the return value must
be set (EAX or RAX for 32 or 64-bit systems, respectively), and filling in data structures
the calling code expects to be filled:
• GetComputerName[83]: Malware commonly wants to gather information about the sys-
tem it has infected, including the name, for purposes of associating stolen data with
a particular computer. Additionally, this is sometimes used to check if the malware
is being executed in a VM, by parsing the name for "VM" or "Virtual Machine," as
is sometimes the default. To handle this function, HookTracer always fills the given
buffer with "Windows7Desktop."
• GetModuleFileNameW[85]: Malware uses this function to find the full path to where
it is running from disk. In this case, while HookTracer fakes the function, the data
returned is correct. HookTracer uses the Volatility API to get the path of the module
requested from the memory image and returns that in the given buffer.
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• System Time Functions: Functions in this family include GetSystemTime [86],
which returns the current time, and SystemTimeToFile [92], which converts the time
supplied by GetSystemTime to a human-readable standard. Malware can use system
time functions for a variety of reasons, from simply logging time of infection to at-
tempting to determine if the environment is virtualized, which may be the case for
some strange timestamps. To provide sane values, HookTracer gets the system time
from when the memory dump was taken using Volatility’s API and returns it.
• Functions used for Timestomping: Timestomping [31] is a name given to an anti-
forensics technique where malware attempts to blend in to the rest of the system by
altering the timestamps of its own files on disk. First, GetFileTime [84] is called,
targeting a common system file. Then, with the normal-looking timestamp in hand,
the malware calls SetFileTime[90] to copy this information onto the malicious file’s
timestamps. To handle this behavior, HookTracer returns a sane timestamp, as in the
case of GetSystemTime, and returns a "success" for the overwrite. It is worth noting
that if such behavior is emulated, the malware may point the investigator directly to
the very files it was trying to hide.
• Filesystem Enumeration: Functions that allow for traversal of the filesystem, such
as FindFirstFile[81] and FindNextFile[82], are often used by malware for finding
files. For instance, an effective piece of ransomware is one that does not leave any
important files alone, and as such wants to traverse the whole Pictures or Documents
directory. To accommodate such malware, HookTracer fakes a realistic directory struc-
ture.
• Process Enumeration: Malware may want to scan the list of currently running pro-
cesses to find victims for code injection, checking for security software, or checking for
VMware tools running on the system to detect virtualization. Functions that allow for
process enumeration are CreateToolhelp32Snapshot [80], Process32First [88], and
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Process32Next [89]. To deal with these calls, HookTracer forges the data structures
required and uses Volatility’s list of active processes to return real information.
The last major revisions that needed to be made for HookTracer to accommodate message
hooks involved functions. For emulating API hooks it was enough to gather low-granularity
information about the memory regions where basic blocks executed, and to generally help
functions along when possible. For message hooks, however, specific function parameters
and data structures matter more for correct malicious behavior, and the specific functions
called inside of a DLL, in addition to the order they are called, matter more as well. To
handle the issue of specific parameters, HookTracer fakes function parameters to certain
functions before emulating them. As an example which will be detailed in the next section,
HookTracer sets up parameters and data structures that Windows would normally generate
after a keystroke to ensure keyloggers can act properly on the data. In order to get the
requisite detail on which functions are called and how they are used, HookTracer records the
parameters passed and the function names, instead of just recording the memory region. In
order to accomplish this, HookTracer is passed a list of functions to monitor where each call
to any of those functions triggers a callback which can then get the specific function name,
as well as the parameters passed to it, from the call.
2.3.3 Analysis
Figure 2.11 Function prototype for a message hook handler.
With the API modifications documented, discussion of hooktracer_messagehooks itself
can begin. The plugin first needs to manually create the data structures that would be
created by Windows during a keystroke. Figure 2.11 shows the parameters sent to the mes-
sage hook handler (the ones that need to be faked) on each event. First, nCode holds either
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HC_ACTION or HC_NOREMOVE. Both indicate that the rest of the parameters hold keystroke
information, with HC_ACTION indicating that the keystroke is current. Next, wParam holds
information associated with the event. Typically, keyloggers will look for WM_KEYDOWN events,
as shown in a snippet of the Gozi [119] malware leaked on github [14] in Figure 2.12. Lastly,
lParam holds a flag which describes the (device specific) key value and other attributes [87].
When populating these fields on creation of the data structure, the plugin fills in the values
as if the user typed ‘A.’ Then, using HookTracer, these data structures are mapped into the
emulated address space. Now, during emulation, any hooks triggered on a keystroke will
actually have data to read, and thus malware can proceed with execution of its payload.
Figure 2.12 Leaked Gozi source code.
In order to determine if a hook is malicious or not, hooktracer_messagehooks looks for
any of several behaviors. At a high level, what most strongly differentiates legitimate and
malicious hooks are how long it takes to process the keystroke data, and where the data is
kept. Legitimate processes are usually fairly quick and do not move the data out of memory.
With that in mind, the following are flagged as strong indicators of malicious behavior:
• Keystroke data is logged to a file, the network, or the registry
• The clipboard is accessed
• Screenshots are taken
• Debugging APIs are used
• CallNextHookEx is called immediately
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The first indicator is flagged because secure, legitimate software will very rarely store
keystrokes at all, but keyloggers exist to get that information off of the infected system
somehow. Clipboard access is flagged because spyware frequently grabs the contents of the
clipboard on keystrokes to try and get passwords which may have been copied. Similarly,
spyware might take screenshots during keystrokes with hooks inserted into the web browser
to get information such as usernames or bank account values. The previously mentioned
Zeus malware does this. Debugging APIs are used by malware for code injection, or for
inspecting the hooked process’ memory. Lastly, an immediate call of CallNextHookEx is
flagged. This function is called at the end of a hook to tell the system that the current hook
is finished, and to call the next one in line. However, since SetWindowsHookEx injects an
entire DLL into the hooked process, malware can use it just to inject a malicious DLL into
many processes by registering a hook that just calls the next hook. Laqma [73] and Carberp
[66, 98] used this technique.
Similar to the grouping functionality in hooktracer, hooktracer_messagehooks supports
trace records. In addition to marking hooks as malicious or not, hooktracer_messagehooks
can list, in order, the specific activity of a hook via the APIs called, and optionally the
parameters for the functions passed to HookTracer in the aforementioned array. This list,
called a trace record, helps an analyst see, in detail, the high level behavior of the hook.
The analyst can pass one or more trace records corresponding to known malicious hooks to
hooktracer_messagehooks to automatically identify these hooks in different processes in the
same system, or on entirely new systems in the future. The goal, as with groupings, is to
allow knowledge and experience to easily propagate.
In order to demonstrate the capabilities of HookTracer and hooktracer_messagehooks,
it was tested against several real malware samples. First on the docket was Turla [32, 70,
22]. Turla is the name of an advanced persistent threat (APT) group thought to be an
elite hacking group inside of one of Russia’s intelligence agencies, but also refers to their
platform for digital espionage. Among many other capabilities, Turla provides the ability to
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log keystrokes and other system data. In particular, Turla makes use of SetWindowsHookEx
to collect this information [76, 77].
Turla was executed in a new VMWare Fusion VM running 64-bit Windows 7 Professional,
updated for all of the latest security and operating system versions. The sample executed
has MD5 hash:
59b57bdabee2ce1fb566de51dd92ec94
This is a DLL deployed by the Turla platform. rundll32.exe was used to execute the
DLL as a traditional executable, a technique documented in recipe 13-2 of the Malware
Analyst’s Cookbook [74]. After execution, to provide normal system usage Turla would
monitor, Notepad was launched and a sentence typed. Next Internet Explorer was launched,
navigating to Google. Lastly, after waiting for 30 seconds, the VM was suspended, causing
a memory dump to be emitted, as described in Chapter 1.
The hooktracer_messagehooks plugin defaults to simply emitting only message hooks it
determines are malicious. To get a better idea of the behavior of these hooks, an investigator
can supply the command line option -list-apis, causing the plugin to generate an ordered list
of exported functions called by the hook, as well as their parameters. This list can be instead
filtered down with the option -list-apis-condensed, causing the list to only show functions
that match a built-in filter. Figure 2.13 shows the result of running the plugin with this last
option against the hook installed by Turla.
The output is fairly lengthy since Turla generates significant activity with its hook. First
(lines 1-5), Turla collects a handle to the current window and the system time and makes
them into a single string. Next (lines 6-10), Turla gathers and formats the process ID
followed by the name of the file backing that process. Lines 11 and 12 show Turla getting
and formating the Window Text, which is faked by HookTracer to be "MyWindowName."
The next line shows Turla moving all of the previous values together with memmove. Lines
14-18 show Turla turning the device specific keyboard code into its corresponding letter, in
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Figure 2.13 hooktracer_messagehooks against Turla.
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this case the ‘A’ faked by HookTracer, and then formatting it into a string. Lines 19-26
are a bit more complicated, but the overall behavior is that Turla is building a path to the
file where it will store the gathered information, and then opening a handle to that file.
In this case the handle is faked by HookTracer (41424344). Lines 28-32 collect and format
information about the name of the computer and the logged on user, and then concatenate
it with all of the information previously gathered, finally, in line 33, writing it to the file.
Lastly the handle is closed and the next hook is called. It is important to stress that this
information required absolutely no reverse engineering on the part of the investigator, and
very minimal knowledge about Windows APIs (most of it is in the names of the strings).
And yet, the investigator can verify very quickly for herself that hooktracer_messagehooks
was indeed correct in its categorization of this hook, and it is made explicitly clear to her
what the malware is doing. In total, analysis of each hook on the system took less than a
minute on a Debian VM with 2 CPU cores and 2GB of RAM. Note that in this output is
a path to a file where the logged information is stored. Information such as this, references
to the host system by functions interacting with the filesystem, registry, or network, can be
automatically saved by hooktracer_messagehooks for future reference or investigation.
Figure 2.14 Trace record for Turla.
Figure 2.14 shows the trace record corresponding to the hook in 2.13. It includes essen-
tially all of the same functions with the exception of string and buffer manipulation functions.
These functions, such as sprintf, can be easily swapped out as the malware is updated,
and so would make the trace record more brittle. Instead, the trace record only includes
Windows APIs which change very infrequently, and would be difficult to replace with other
calls and get the same behavior.
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The next malware tested against was Loki Bot [79, 125], spyware that focuses on stealing
credentials and logging keystrokes. Unlike Turla, Loki Bot is not a nation’s espionage tool,
but is instead for sale on underground markets. The version tested has MD5 hash:
eccad903b4c27d149e159338f58481a9
and is a 32-bit executable. In order to correctly execute it, the steps given in [103] are used.
Like with Turla, Notepad was opened and used to create a short document, and then Internet
Explorer was opened, navigating to Google. After 30 seconds the VM was suspended. Figure
2.15 shows the output of hooktracer_messagehooks with the -list-apis-condensed option.
Much of the behavior here is the same as with Turla. The first 16 lines are used to retrieve
the keystroke value, line 18 retrieves the (faked) window name which it writes to a file. Line
30 shows the hook reading the contents of the clipboard (faked to be "BBBBCCCCDDDD"),
re-opening the file, and writing the contents of the clipboard prepended with ‘CB.’ Lastly,
the faked keystroke, ‘A,’ is written to the file before the hook passes along execution to the
next hook.
Lastly, the plugin was run against Gozi, also known as Ursnif or ISFB, a banking trojan
which is still widely used after over a decade, albeit with many modifications [112, 120, 114].
The sample executed was a 32-bit executable with MD5 hash:
F e6d118192fc848797e15dc0600834783
Like the last two samples, Notepad and Internet Explorer were run and interacted with,
and then 30 seconds later the VM was suspended. Figure 2.16 shows the output of the
plugin with the condensed API listing option. First, Gozi consumes the infected thread’s
input data, collects information about the module it has infected, collects system time and
current window, and collects information about the keystroke. In addition to performing
operations on the keystroke, Gozi also makes use of debug APIs by interacting with the
thread input queues, hitting another of the malicious criteria.
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Figure 2.15 hooktracer_messagehooks against Loki Bot.
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Figure 2.16 hooktracer_messagehooks against Gozi.
2.3.4 Limitations
By attempting automated detection of malicious hooks, hooktracer_messagehooks becomes
somewhat brittle. For example, the yty malware used by the Donot Team [124] APT is a
37
keylogger that uses SetWindowsHookEx but does not get flagged as malicious by the plugin.
Figure 2.17 shows the result of running the plugin on a yty hook. The malware does not
try to log the keystroke to a file, only allocating and deallocating some memory and per-
forming conversions from keystroke to character. As it turns out, the keystrokes are stored
in memory until a certain number are accumulated, at which point they are written to a
file, but since HookTracer only fakes a single keystroke, this behavior is missed. While this
technique of holding onto keystrokes before writing them to disk is fairly rare, as it can cause
missed keystrokes, it does demonstrate that some malicious behavior can be overlooked by
HookTracer. For example, a hook handler that only behaves maliciously if a certain se-
quence of keystrokes are detected, a username for instance, would be very hard to trigger.
In these cases, however, the plugin still tells an investigator that this executable handled the
keystroke, which may lead them to investigate further since it is not readily apparent what
is happening. This issue is hard to overcome through the methods discussed thus far, but a
possible way forward is discussed in Section 4.1.
Figure 2.17 hooktracer_messagehooks against Donot Team’s Keylogger.
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2.4 Iodine
In Section 2.2.4 it was mentioned that a hook passing control flow to a section of memory
not backed by a file on disk, an injected region, may indicate malicious activity. Indeed,
code injection is frequently employed by malware for a variety of reasons, including staging
code for hooked API functions. Since this technique might be used even when no code hooks
are used, it is useful to detect injected code separately from code hooks. The Volatility
plugin malfind does just this, detecting code injected through remote code injection (1.3.2),
reflective DLL injection (1.3.3), or process hollowing (1.3.4). Similar to apihooks, however,
malfind suffers from a relatively high false positive rate, and produces a significant amount
of output which does not tell the investigator much of use about any injected code. Figure
2.18 shows the truncated output of malfind when run against a memory sample infected with
Stuxnet [40]. This view allows the investigator to see some useful strings, identify possible
shellcode, and locate the process and address of interest. However, malfind gives many such
outputs, and there is clearly a significant amount of follow-up work to be done on each. Due
to this problem’s similarity to the problems that lead to the development of HookTracer,
modifications were made again to the API in order to support development of a plugin,
iodine. This plugin consumes the output of malfind and attempts to discover and emulate
injected shellcode. The following sections detail the changes made to the HookTracer API to
accommodate this plugin, introduce the test data, and explore the results of applying these
methods to injected code.
2.4.1 Once More, With Feeling
Several changes and modifications needed to be introduced to HookTracer in order to ac-
commodate the new challenges. Firstly, while previous iterations included functionality for
noting exported function addresses to resolve them to symbol names, this update took this
process a step further. Not all exported functions are discoverable by walking the module
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Figure 2.18 Process infected by Stuxnet, as uncovered through malfind.
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list exposed by Volatility, as some DLLs only provide this information in a related Program
Database (PDB) file. For completeness, when this portion of the work was beginning, Hook-
Tracer was updated to check for the existence of a file containing data processed from a
PDB file corresponding to each DLL in the module list and adds the names and addresses
of functions in that file to its exported functions list. To produce such a file, the project
pdbparse [36] can be leveraged to automatically download the PDB associated with a specific
DLL from Microsoft’s Symbol Server. Then, the script pdbparse_print_gvars can be used
to parse the PDB into a format consumable by Hook Tracer. This technique will be used
again later, in Section 3.2.2.
As with hooktracer_messagehooks, the HookTracer API needed to be augmented to ad-
dress problems specific to consuming malfind output and exploring shellcode. Unlike the
output of apihooks, some regions detected by malfind are not suitable for emulation. Often
a region will be detected which is mostly full of zero-bytes. Such a region was likely reserved
by a process for legitimate reasons, and attempting to emulate it can lead to unexpected
behavior or misleading results. Similarly, as discussed in Section 1.3, entire PE files may
be mapped into a victim process’s memory. While this is indeed maliciously injected code,
emulating the PE the way we emulate code stubs will not yield useful or correct results. To
work around this, HookTracer’s callback for accesses to unmapped memory was changed to
detect executable headers at the start of the page, or to detect pages that start with a large
number of zero-bytes. If either of these things are true, the page is not mapped into memory,
halting emulation, and an error is emitted explaining the situation. This process cuts down
on the run time of the plugin and produces cleaner results.
The next hurdle was detecting actual shellcode. Another type of false positive frequently
encountered through malfind is legitimately mapped RWX memory inside of a process which
contains benign code, or perhaps junk data which disassembles into nonsense code. Malicious
code, however, will not only be valid assembly, but will often attempt to quickly pivot to
some other region in memory. To differentiate this from benign or junk code, HookTracer’s
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basic block discovery callback was changed to parse out instructions which may redirect
control flow, such as jumps or calls. The targets of these calls are then either pulled from
the instruction, in the case of branches to some immediate, or calculated based on the values
in referenced registers or memory. After all the branch targets in a given basic block are
discovered, a check is done to see if both the target of the branch and the branch instruction
lie inside the VAD where emulation started. In cases where the instruction is inside the
starting VAD but the target is outside, the callback flags the branch to be reported to the
investigator. Additionally, for clarity, the branch target is compared to list of exported
functions HookTracer maintains for the emulated code. If the branch targets an address
near the starting address of an exported function, the branch is reported as targeting an
offset from that function. This will oftentimes highlight code hooks immediately, because
when the malicious activity of a hooked function is complete, it typically returns to the
original implementation to finish processing the API call correctly. This is the other side of
a phenomenon noted in Section 2.2.4, and why hooktracer was designed to report jumps to
non-file-backed regions.
Lastly, more functions needed to be "implemented" in HookTracer, as described in Section
2.3.2. These were all functions discovered through iteratively running the plugin, checking
which functions caused strange output, and writing implementations to try and alleviate the
issues.
2.4.2 The Usual Suspects
In order to test iodine, a set of memory images from computers infected with a variety of
malware was used. This set was provided as part of the Volatility Malware and Memory
Forensics Training course, and was chosen because the infections were known and studied by
expert investigators, and a write up on each of the infections, in the form of a Lab Guide,
existed and allowed for a ground truth to be established in terms of correct detections, false
negatives, and false positives. Of the memory images in this set, nine were infected with
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malware which actually performed code injection, and so these were specifically used to test
iodine. The included malware were:
1. Stuxnet, Windows XP: A computer worm which infected Windows systems in an at-
tempt to eventually compromise industrial control systems [40].
2. Rovnix, Windows 7 x64: A bootkit which adds the compromised computer to a large
botnet [58].
3. Infected PDF, Windows XP: A malicious PDF file, not associated with a known mal-
ware family, which exploits an (at the time) zero day in Adobe Reader. It has SHA-1
hash: d56583b014ccbefc42c9f507a0865d4f5c825f5b.
4. Zeus, Windows XP: A banking trojan discussed in Section 2.2.4 [59, 134].
5. Mimikatz, Windows 8 x64, Windows Server 2008 x64, Windows 7 x64: Mimikatz is
an open source tool for credential stealing [35]. While this tool is frequently employed
by penetration testers, it is also used in actual malware. Four of the memory images
were infected with mimikatz, one Windows 8 system, a Windows Server 2008 system,
and two Windows 7 systems. The last three were part of the same scenario meant to
model an APT moving across a corporate network.
6. TDSS, Windows XP: A banking trojan and bootkit discussed in Section 2.2.4 [94].
Once all of the memory images were collected, malfind was run against each sample, with
output specified as a JSON file. Then, iodine was run, targeting the corresponding sample
and JSON, with the output being directly written to a text file.
2.4.3 Analysis
As described in Section 2.4.1, analysis was an iterative process, where results from one
run of iodine were used to update the API in useful ways. Here, we discuss the analysis
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done after the final such iteration. For each sample, the malfind output was manually
investigated, to verify that the iodine output correctly emulated the discovered shellcode,
correctly detected any injected PE files, and correctly skipped any zero-regions. Then, any
functions which looked like they might be involved in an API hook were checked against the
apihooks plugin, to see if this was the case. Once this verification was complete, the iodine
output was compared against the ground-truth provided by the lab guide to verify that
detected shellcode was indeed the result of code injection, and that processes determined to
be hosting such code were indeed infected.
The Zeus sample was analyzed first, and its iodine output is shown in Figure 2.19. Indeed,
each of the detected pieces of shellcode, denoted by the "Branch Addr" column, leaves its
hosting VAD, and each of the processes with shellcode detected in them are processes Zeus
has injected code into. Furthermore, analysis through apihooks shows that the function
ZwCreateThread was in fact hooked, which is indicated through iodine displaying the jump
into that function.
Next, the malicious PDF sample was examined, as shown in Figure 2.20. Similarly to
the Zeus sample, each of the three infected processes are correctly identified, and both of the
jumps into API functions are indeed jumps into hooked functions. Additionally, the calls
to 0xb20ff0 and 0xb1d9d0 eventually lead to calls to functions apihooks identifies as being
hooked, as shown in Figure 2.21.
The output from analyzing the TDSS infected sample is shown in Figure 2.22. As with
the previous samples, infected processes and hooked functions are correctly identified. Pa-
rameters passed to the ZwCreateEvent function can also be seen in Figure 2.23, which
can give investigators a better idea about the behavior of the injected code. Parameters
to functions called are typically only printed when they are deemed potentially interesting
enough, typically the case with strings or flags, to avoid cluttering the output in a distract-
ing way. As such, the parameters to RtlAllocateHeap are omitted, while the parameters to
ZwCreateEvent are displayed.
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Figure 2.19 Output of iodine against a Zeus-infected image. The three rightmost
columns have been cropped to save space.
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Figure 2.20 Output of iodine against a sample infected by a malicious PDF. The
three rightmost columns have been cropped to save space.
Figure 2.21 Output of iodine against a sample infected by a malicious PDF. The
three leftmost columns and several rows have been cropped to save space. The
functions starting with "JS" or "?js" are detected as hooked by apihooks
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Figure 2.22 Output of iodine against a sample infected by TDSS. The three right-
most columns have been cropped to save space.
Figure 2.23 Functions called during emulation of shellcode in a TDSS infected
image, along with parameters.
The Windows 8 machine infected with mimikatz was perhaps even more illustrative to
the investigator. Figure 2.24 shows the function call information yielded by the infected
process. The shellcode can be seen collecting information about the context it is executing
in by grabbing the module handle, header information, and then checking the environment
for certain strings. As in the previous examples, injected shellcode was discovered and
emulated, and hooked API functions were revealed in the process.
The three other machines infected with mimikatz (or, malware which included mimikatz
as its payload) were somewhat more interesting. Figure 2.25 shows the sole potential shell-
code region for the Windows Server image, out of almost a hundred processes found by
malfind. It is unclear immediately what is going on, as the functions called (aside from
memset) are fairly arcane, and the jump was done indirectly. It seems possible that iodine
might have picked up some junk code. Investigation with volshell, however, quickly indi-
Figure 2.24 Functions called during emulation of shellcode in a mimikatz infected
image, along with parameters.
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Figure 2.25 Shellcode discovered in Mimikatz infected Windows Server machine.
Figure 2.26 Shellcode discovered in Mimikatz infected Windows Server machine,
examined with volshell.
cated that this is likely a forensically interesting region. Figure 2.26 shows the disassembly
at the beginning of the region malfind detected. An address is moved into rax before the
jump, so the address itself was examined next, as shown in Figure 2.27. The value stored
at 0x7eff19a138 does indeed appear to be another address, and so that address was again
disassembled, as shown in Figure 2.28. This seems to be a stub of shellcode setting up a
function call, calling that function, and then returning. Analyzing the next of these infected
machines found a very similar injection, as shown in figures 2.29 and 2.30. The output has
been broken down again for readability, but the former shows again the same function call
pattern as seen in the server, after another jump to [rax] 10 bytes into a given memory
region. The latter shows a Firefox process exhibiting similar environment-querying behav-
ior as the Mimikatz infected Windows 8 instance, shown in Figure 2.24, as well as a hook
installed in the same function. The last of these machines seems to have captured Mimikatz
at its most active. Figures 2.31 and 2.32 show some of the injected processes discovered in
the final sample. Omitted is a Firefox injection identical to 2.30.
Figure 2.27 Examining the pointer in Figure 2.26
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Figure 2.28 Disassembling the address found in Figure 2.27
Figure 2.29 Infected explorer.exe process.
Figure 2.30 Infected Firefox process.
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Figure 2.31 Hooked LoadLibrary calls, followed by calls to undocumentedWindows
functions, and another injection into explorer.exe.
The last of this set of memory images examined was infected by Stuxnet. Figures 2.33
and 2.34 show the most interesting pieces of the output. Notably, all of the infected regions
make similar calls to GetProcAddress and VirtualProtect. As shown in the latter figure,
twelve such calls are made, corresponding to fetching the address of six separate functions
and then changing their permissions to 0x80, or PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY, which is exactly
what is needed to hook these functions. Indeed, in Symantec’s Stuxnet Dossier [40], it is
noted that stuxnet hooks six functions in Ntdll, ZwMapViewOfSection, ZwCreateSection,
ZwOpenFile, ZwCloseFile, ZwQueryAttributesFile, and ZwQuerySection, and that this
pattern of hooks is an indicator of compromise for Stuxnet. In this memory sample, these
six functions are found at the addresses fetched in Figure 2.34.
One final sample was examined, outside of the set provided through the Volatility training
course. The SANS institute issued a challenge for detecting and studying the Skeleton Key
[57] attack, and provided an infected memory image for this purpose. This image was infected
with Mimikatz, which includes an implementation of this attack. Figure 2.35 shows the
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Figure 2.32 Code injection into Internet Explorer processes, and indication of many
function hooks.
51
Figure 2.33 Injected regions discovered in several process of a Stuxnet infected
sample.
Figure 2.34 Function call list produced by code injected into lsass.exe.
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Figure 2.35 Function call list produced by code injected into lsass.exe.
Figure 2.36 Mimikatz source code for the Skeleton Key initialization function.
cropped output of iodine on this sample, specifically the functions called during emulation
and their addresses. Figure 2.36 shows the Mimikatz source code of exactly the function
being emulated. Specifically the function calls we see are found on lines 6, 8, 11, 12, 15,
16, and 19. Clearly the addresses shown in this code are not the addresses shown in Figure
2.35. This is a feature of Mimikatz. The strings which are repeated values such as 4a are
searched for in process memory and overwritten with the correct addresses. The functions
that overwrite which values can be seen in Figure 2.37
Importantly, the iodine plugin in every case correctly detected injected shellcode, ana-
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Figure 2.37 Mimikatz source code for overwriting patterns in memory, truncated
for clarity.
lyzed the shellcode, and presented the results in a concise, readable manner, without any
analysis required by a potential investigator aside from running malfind on a sample to pro-
duce the requisite JSON file. While the process to clean up the results was iterative, so that
functions could be implemented in HookTracer, this is not a necessary step and the results
are correct without it. As the plugin is more widely used, and more functions are imple-
mented, this will become less of an issue. That being said, implementing a new function is
usually a matter of ten to thirty minutes of work, as HookTracer has built in functionality
to simplify the process.
2.5 Related Work
As mentioned in Chapter 1, emulation is commonly used in computer security for malware
analysis [136, 62, 12, 68] and has been for many years, but until recently all of this work
required a whole-system emulator such as QEMU or Bochs [71]. Likewise, significant work
on virtual machine introspection (VMI) [72, 2, 3, 4, 60, 46, 96, 38] in relation to malware
analysis has been done in the past decade. VMI allows processes inside of a guest machine
to be monitored by the host, granting relative safety from the malware. Finally, sandboxes
such as Cuckoo [33] allow for automated running of and report generation about malware.
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While such technologies are useful for analyzing malware, they are unfortunately not
suitable for memory analysis because of the substantial differences between an executable
on disk and one loaded into memory. Because of this, executables cannot usually be carved
out of memory and run directly. Additionally, memory-only malware does not share most
of the structure found in an executable, and thus cannot be bundled into an executable and
run directly. These systems also require extensive instrumentation of the target machine and
specialized labs that cannot be reasonably used in incident response situations.
Emulation, and particularly unicorn have been applied to memory forensics as well, with
two recent efforts. The first, ROPMEMU [48, 123], automatically detects ROP chains [78] in
memory. The second detects the "Gargoyle" attack, where a malware hides itself by changing
permissions on its code using a timer. Neither of these projects overlap with HookTracer,
however they are still important to note.
Effort has been made to analyze API hooks in memory through a research project and
the resulting Volatility plugin, apihooksdeep [122]. This plugin uses fuzzy hashing [65] to
generate a hash set of the hook code. First, the owning module must be extracted from
memory, and then targeted by a tool that actually generates the hash set. The hash set
can be used as a filter to exclude known-good hooks from being outputted. This process is
fairly inaccessible, since generating a reasonable set of hashes requires a clean memory image
containing every process from which the investigator wishes to exclude running and hooking
code. Additionally, these hashes may need to be updated when updates are pushed to the
permitted applications.
Lastly, a very recent (awaiting publication at the time of this writing) effort has been
made to automatically determine capabilities of malware found in memory images [5]. Similar
to the work presented here, FORECAST analyzes and emulates malicious code found in a
memory image, with a specific focus on the API functions called. However, FORECAST uses
this information to make predictions about the high-level capabilities of the malware found
in an infected system, whereas this work is focused on helping investigators determine if an
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infection is present on the system.
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Chapter Three. Seance
Memory forensic tools such as Volatility and Recall [128, 47] rely heavily on being able
to reproduce the functionality of code on a system under analysis. In particular, memory
forensic tools need to access certain members of data structures, typically in the same way
related code does. As such, changes to critical data structures have the potential to badly
break tools, with identification and correction of the underlying problem requiring significant
effort. Such breaks could manifest as anything from the tool not running to incorrect results,
with no appropriate error messages. An analyst in the middle of an investigation, then, may
have to wait on an official fix to the tool to be issued, or come up with one themselves. In
either case, such a delay could range from stressful to unacceptable. In order to address this
problem, a binary analysis tool called Seance was developed to automatically detect changes
to data structures based on changes to code that natively interacts with those structures.
This effort attempts to leverage binary analysis capabilities to automatically verify com-
patibility of forensic tools with new versions of forensic targets. Take for example an update
to the some language’s runtime system. An investigator might be using memory analysis
tools reliant on knowing the location of certain members of various data structures used
by the system. Determining if her tool still works might require a significant reverse engi-
neering effort to see what, if anything, has changed in a multitude of different structures or
functions that access them. Without such an effort, the investigator would not know if her
tool would produce nonsense results, or even misleadingly incorrect results, either of which
are unacceptable in a forensic context. Seance alleviates much of this effort. Initially, work
was done to try and use HookTracer for this purpose, but fundamental design choices in
HookTracer meant that it was not suitable in this domain. Namely, during emulation, only
a single path is taken through the target code since all values are predetermined. This results
in situations where, for instance, an access to a data structure that triggers on a specific set
of circumstances is completely missed. To address this problem, a new backing API, which
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powers Seance, was designed as an alternative to HookTracer, and which takes inspiration
from the design and motivation of HookTracer to instrument execution of code for forensic
ends. Instead of making use of unicorn directly, this API is built on top of angr (see Section
1.4.2) to take advantage of its symbolic execution (see Section 1.4) capabilities. The goal
behind this API is to get more detailed execution information than HookTracer can provide,
and to that end results in two major improvements:
• Control flow graph (CFG) generation: If one were to construct a control flow
graph for emulation conducted with either of the HookTracer plugins, the result would
be a single path, possibly with cycles arising from loops. This is because each time the
emulation encounters a branch it only gathers information about one tine of the fork.
Instead, using Seance’s API, both paths are taken, and information about program
state for each execution is recorded. Using some of angr’s built in analyses, a full
control flow graph can be constructed for each hook.
• Memory Access Information: Whenever the emulated code makes an attempt to
read or write memory, the access is recorded and associated with the particular state
where it happened. Due to the symbolic nature of some values during emulation, these
accesses may be referencing addresses or writing values that have no concrete value.
Once all of the emulation is completed, however, for each ending state reached, every
memory access that occurred over the path leading to that state is concretized by the
path-specific constraints at the time of the access. The end result of this is a record
of all memory accesses conforming to the context in which they were created. Take
for example code that reads in a symbolic value, say Vx, and branches based on if Vx
is less than 10 or not. After this, the code writes the value of Vx to memory. In this
analysis, then, the result would be two records of the write, one with some concrete
value less than 10 and one with some concrete value greater than or equal to 10.
The first application of this API is towards the problem detailed above: Seance can be
58
deployed targeting functions which access forensically important members of relevant struc-
tures and return a listing of the offsets into the target data structure where were accessed.
This can reveal if new members have been added to that structure, if members have been
removed, if types have changed, or if the function accesses a completely different structure.
Additionally, the CFG capabilities of Seance can be used to see changes to the function itself
that may impact the correctness of tools or reveal new implementation details.
In this chapter, examples of code are given which include various forensically valuable data
structures, but that change significantly across versions. Additionally, it is demonstrated that
Seance detects all such significant changes through the creation of a database containing
automatically generated fingerprints of the target data structures across a test set of code
versions, generation of signatures from several temporally discontiguous versions of the same
code, and finally a comparison of the new results to the database. Furthermore, it is shown
that this process indeed provides valuable information about the nature of those changes,
and thus dramatically reduces the burden they impose on investigators and maintainers of
forensic tools.
3.1 On Reading Bones
This section documents the current approaches to data structure layout reconstruction used
in memory analysis frameworks, along with the limitations to these approaches. This topic
will be partially discussed in Section 3.4, but given its complexity and central role in moti-
vating our research effort, it has also been included this section for completeness.
When a memory forensic developer wishes to learn the layout of a data structure of
interest, there are three possibilities [75]. The first two, source code review and use of
debugging symbols, are generally easier than the third, binary analysis, but are not always
accurate, complete, or even feasible. In those situations, binary analysis is the only choice
available. Luckily, if an application accesses target members of a data structure, those
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accesses will be encoded within instructions in the executable module. This means binary
analysis is not only possible in virtually every context, but it is also guaranteed to encode
the correct offset.
3.1.1 Source Code Review
Approach
This method uses access to the source code of an application to determine the name, layout,
and purpose of data structures of interest. By knowing the compiler rules for how data
structures are laid out in memory compared to their source code representation, is it often
possible to manually build out the data structure layout.
Limitations
The first limitation of this approach is its extremely time-consuming and error prone nature
in cases of large code bases. One miscalculation for a structure member will break the derived
offsets for all remaining members. Considering dozens of data structures are often needed for
deep analysis and that each data structure often has dozens of members, the chance of such
miscalculation occurring is high. Furthermore, to support the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of
applications, this process must be repeated twice for each module release. Also complicating
matters is that the compiler and linker optimizations can create significant changes in the
data structures and ultimately the final view of the binary. As discussed in related works
[18, 102, 29], compiler alignment of structure members has a drastic effect on this layout and
the alignment choices are not always discernible just from viewing the source code.
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3.1.2 Use of Debugging Symbols
Approach
When debug files contain complete type and symbol information then nothing else must
be done except to convert that information into a representation that the memory analysis
framework understands. The two main file formats for this information are PDB files from
Visual Studio and DWARF files on Linux and Mac. The PDB file format has been reverse
engineered to enable extracting all information and the DWARF format is fully documented.
Limitations
The main limitation of this approach is that complete debugging information is not pub-
lished for many of the modules needed for memory analysis. As mentioned previously, some
vendors publish debug information of their production executable modules, and the two most
commonly used in memory forensics are the Microsoft symbol server and the kernel build
repositories maintained by various Linux distributions. Unfortunately, those published by
Microsoft are usually only complete for the kernel executable itself.
In the situation where source code of a target module is available but the vendor does
not publish debug files, researchers will often compile the source code on their own with
debugging enabled to generate a local debug information file. When the compiler version
and settings of the target module are known then this workflow is generally accurate, but
accuracy decreases when the exact build environment configuration cannot be replicated.
Furthermore, there are platforms, such as macOS, that mix closed and open source code, so





Given the inability of the previous methods to work in many situations, memory analysis ca-
pabilities are often built using binary analysis. This approach requires an expert investigator
to find the functions within a module that reference needed structure members.
Limitations
This is a time consuming approach that requires an expert to manually reverse engineer many
components of target modules. The expert must then manually record all offsets and types
discovered into the target framework’s format. This makes the effort not only extremely
time consuming, but also error-prone and non-repeatable.
Shared Limitations
There is also a significant, shared limitation of all three approaches in that they only at-
tempt to acquire the offsets of needed members of a data structure. As demonstrated with
Objective-C in Section 3.3.1, when attempting to correctly support a wide variety of versions,
just having the offset is not enough. Instead, the semantics of the operations performed on
that offset must be understood, so that frameworks can find and report valid artifacts. The
combined issues and limitations of current approaches all necessitate the need for automated
approaches to processing modules at the instruction level.
3.2 How to Commune With Spirits
3.2.1 Lighting The Candles
This section describes the implementation of Seance. Like HookTracer, a large part of Seance
is implemented as an API that different programs can make use of. This engine is composed
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of a few callbacks and several functions to aid in analysis.
The API assumes that the tools making use of it have already instantiated an angr project
because turning such instantiation into an API call would require roughly the same amount
of work for the person building the tool. An angr project is the basic structure that angr
operates on, and is constructed by giving angr a binary to look at (this can also be a "blob,"
a binary with no executable structure such as a chunk of memory pulled from an image), and
several options on how to interpret the binary. Most relevant to this work are "backend,"
"arch," and "segments," which give the structure of the binary (for instance PE, ELF, or
blob), the processor architecture to use, and an array of segments. This last option is used
in the case that the binary has sections that need to be treated as if they were at a different
address, as is the case when trying to load a process’s whole address space as a single binary
while maintaining a relatively manageable file size. Additionally, it is assumed that the tool
using Seance starts the emulation itself with the callbacks it wants to use registered, but the
callbacks themselves are provided by Seance. The four currently supported callbacks trigger
on register reads and writes, and memory reads and writes. The behavior of these callbacks
is as follows:
• Emulation check: The actual first check of these callbacks is of a global flag which
is True if emulation is ongoing, or False otherwise. This is because post-emulation
accesses during analysis still trigger the callbacks and should be ignored.
• Check if the target can be found: The first real step in each of these callbacks is
to make sure the access targets a concrete register or memory address. If it does not,
the callback exits after printing a warning. If it can, the specific register or address
are recorded, along with the length of the access, in a globally stored record of reads
or writes, depending on the access type.
• Record data: Next, in the case of a register write, a check is made that the register is
not an instruction pointer as this would be called after every instruction. In all other
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cases, or if this check comes back negative, the callback records the expression being
written or read, the condition that triggered the access, the length of the access, and
finally an ordered list of basic blocks visited.
Seance also provides functionality to handle stashes. Stashes are groups of states created
during emulation, and all of the states in all of the stashes is what allows Seance to sort out
what actions happened when, and with which results. This is done via the handle_stashes
function, which iterates over all of the ending states. During each iteration, a list of basic
blocks visited is collected and compared against the basic blocks recorded in each memory
access. If the list of blocks in the access is completely contained in the history of the end
state, the access is recorded as having taken place sometime during the execution that lead
to this end state. For each of these accesses, the access address or register is concretized,
checked against the bounds of the address space, and if it is in bounds, concretized and
recorded as a string, a hexadecimal number, and as bytes. Additionally, each basic block
visited is added to a list of permissible blocks to visit during CFG generation. A record of
each end state along with their corresponding accesses is created, and returned along with
the list of permissible blocks.
The next important functionality provided by the API is generation of the CFG. The
function generate_cfg handles this, and expects a start address, the current project, and a
permit list of blocks. generate_cfg attempts to construct the CFG, and if it exists, prints
out the number of nodes and edges, and returns the graph. From here, if the user wants,
she can call the function print_cfg to output the given CFG as a png.
In addition to providing analysis capabilities, Seance also supports scanning of the target
binary to gather information to help the analysis. If a user has a specific function she wants
to target, in terms of a symbol name, Seance’s get_symbol_addr function will attempt to
locate that symbol’s starting and ending addresses. To find the start address, angr is first
leveraged to see if the symbol is included in the information packaged with the binary. If not,
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Seance checks for a PDB file, if one exists, and tries to resolve the symbol address in that.
In either case, if the symbol is located, Seance then attempts to locate an ending address
for the target function by enumerating the symbols and finding the closest symbol which
begins at a larger address than the target. Then, using angr to process the instructions,
Seance scans backwards from that address looking for the first instruction that is not a nop
or int 3 instruction, both of which are common ways to fill space between functions. Once
Seance finds such an instruction, the address of that instruction is returned as a potential
ending address of the symbol. Further, instead of just targeting a specific symbol, a user
may want to target a specific portion of that symbol. This might be the case if some function
is not passed a data structure as a parameter, but instead calls a separate function which
returns that structure, and then the outer function proceeds to operate on the structure.
In such a case, the user does not need to know the whole behavior of the symbol they
choose to target, but just the behavior between calls to one or more other functions. To
support this use case, Seance provides the find_bb_containing function, which accepts a
list of one or more function names, and scans the binary for contiguous sequences of basic
blocks which each call one of those functions, and returns a list of starting addresses for such
chains of basic blocks. The user can then cross reference the addresses of those basic blocks
with the addresses inside their target (outer) function. In cases where the outer function is
broken into non-contiguous memory regions, as is sometimes the case, the find_jumps_out
function will scan the target function for jumps, either jmp or jcc instructions, which end
outside of its starting memory region, as found by the methods mentioned above. Then, the
get_jump_regions breaks these jump addresses into regions where no jump target is more
than 0x200 bytes from the next target, which are then included when cross-referencing the
starting addresses of basic block chains. This number was chosen after examining one such
function, found in tcpip.sys, and seeing how much distance there was between pieces of the
function. The chosen number works well in practice, but can be tweaked if needed.
Lastly, Seance provides functionality for the processing of data produced during the
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instrumented symbolic execution. The function sort_access consumes the read and write
data from the execution and yields:
• Offsets from initial register values, for each register
• Offsets from pointers, for each pointer
• Sources for the pointers discovered, to two degrees of indirection
An example of the result of this post-processing can be seen in Figure 3.1. This post-
processing is what allows an investigator to clearly see accesses to data structure members,
and allows for the construction of databases of access-patterns for different versions of a
binary.
3.2.2 Parting the Veil
This section discusses how the components described in Section 3.2 were composed to create
Seance. It is important to first cover exactly what the inputs and outputs of Seance are. To
this end, Seance consumes:
• A binary Despite research efforts, binary analysis remains impossible without a binary.
• A target The user must provide a target function she wishes to analyse. This can be
either the name of a symbol for Seance to resolve, or a starting and ending address.
The address mode was created to assist in debugging, but was left in as uses cases for
it might manifest in the future.
• Optional list of sub-targets If the user wants to single out a specific section of her
target function (as described in 3.2) in which one or more functions are called, she may
specify a list of sub-targets, each of which may be either a symbol name or an address.
• Optional PDB data file In the case that the binary to be analyzed has an associated
PDB file, Seance will try and find a file containing information derived from this file
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Figure 3.1 Reading memory accesses back out of JSON files generated from analysis
of a function in Windows’ tcpip.sys.
through use of the pdbpares tool [36] as described in Section ??. Specifically the script
pdb_print_gvars.py, provided by pdbparse, must be called on the associated PDB
file. The output of this should be redirected to a file named "gvars" in the directory
which contains the binary under analysis. Seance will look for this gvars file, which
contains symbols and their offsets into the binary, and use this to resolve symbols when
angr cannot.
• User Options Lastly, the user may provide command line options to further influence
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the behavior of Seance. The most important of these are specific registers to target,
whether or not to zero-fill registers or memory, and whether or not to skip function
calls during symbolic execution.
And then from these inputs, Seance yields:
• A printed canonical CFG The first analysis Seance does is production of a CFG of
the targeted code. A representation of this CFG is emitted as a PNG file.
• Analysis of the CFG The CFG produced is analyzed, yielding the number of nodes,
number of ending states, and number of function calls, which are saved in a JSON file.
• Raw information from symbolic execution For debugging purposes, Seance saves
the raw data produced from the instrumented symbolic execution. This is the same
data Seance will further process to produce the following items, and as such represents
something of an intermediate state for Seance.
• Information for each ending state Symbolic execution may result in several dif-
ferent ending states for a given starting point. From the raw information ntoed above,
Seance pulls apart the specific information from each ending state, produces a CFG
for that particular state’s history, prints it and saves the execution information. Addi-
tionally, Seance produces the offset and pointer information for each ending state and
saves these as well. This is all again mostly for debugging purposes, as the information
for a single ending state is often easier to examine than that for the whole run.
• Offset information Seance further processes the offset information, that is the in-
formation about memory accesses to addresses at an offset from the initial value in
each register, produced for each state. This information is consolidated, repetitions
are removed, and a JSON file is emitted with this information. For the sake of any
humans involved, Seance also emits a pretty-printed version of this data.
68
• Pointer information As above, but for information about accesses to memory ad-
dresses at an offset to another memory access. Again, a JSON version and a human-
readable version of this information are produced.
• Back-traced pointer information Seance tries to trace back any discovered pointers
to their origin, two times over. Some data structures encountered were indeed sub-
structures of another structure, and were accessed as offsets from pointers to pointers.
To capture this behavior, Seance looks at any pointers discovered and checks if that
pointer was originally pointed to by another pointer or register. This process is then
repeated to capture second-degree indirection, and the results are combined and saved
again to JSON and human-readable files.
The data emitted by Seance are further processed later as part of an automated workflow,
but these are the basic inputs and outputs to the system. With this in mind, the actual
computation of Seance is as follows:
1. Parse inputs
2. Locate symbol Find both the starting and ending address of a symbol, as described
in Section 3.2.
3. Generate canonical CFG Generate the CFG through static means.
4. Analyze canonical CFG Collect the number of nodes, deadends, and functions
called. Generate a list of deadends’ addresses.
5. Symbolic execution
(a) Install callbacks Callbacks discussed in Section 3.2.
(b) Begin execution Symbolic execution stops on finding a deadend in the CFG.
Repeat for each deadend discovered in step 4.
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(c) Log memory accesses Done automatically by the callbacks as execution hap-
pens.
6. Pre-process execution data
(a) Separate memory reads from writes It is useful to know what type of access
is being handled.
(b) Concretize any symbolic values If the destination of an access is symbolic,
concretize it so that it can be reasoned about more easily.
(c) Record concretized accesses
(d) Generate permit-list of basic blocks To check that execution behaved rea-
sonably, generate a permit-list of basic blocks accessed during execution, to use
in step 8.
7. Process memory accesses The mechanisms for this are described in Section 3.2.
(a) Collect offsets from registers
(b) Collect offsets from pointers
(c) Find pointer sources
8. Generate real CFG Generate a second CFG, restricted to only touch basic blocks
in the permit list from step 6d.
Now that the operational details of Seance have been covered, the next section will
describe the post-processing of this output to integrate into an automated workflow.
3.2.3 Secrets from Beyond the Grave
The direct output of a particular run of Seance may be interesting, or even useful, in its
own right, but cross-referencing offsets and CFG data from multiple runs quickly becomes
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unmanageable. To further alleviate the burden on investigators, additional post-processing
capabilities were developed to cross-reference multiple runs of Seance and produce concise,
human-readable output. The most common reason to cross-reference multiple Seance runs
is to compare runs targeting the same symbol, in the same binary, across multiple versions.
As such, the post-processing iterates over each such run, collecting the JSON files containg
offset and CFG information and adding them into a larger JSON file, tagged with the binary
version. This is the database for this particular symbol.
Once a database has been created for a symbol, an additional utility can be used to
cross-reference the output of that run against the database. For each binary version in the
database, the following process is performed. First, the CFG is compared to determined if
it exactly matches the current run, meaning if the number of nodes and deadends are the
same, as well as the number of external functions called.
The offset-accesses are compared multiple ways, to gauge levels of similarity. First, a
literal comparison is performed, checking if the offsets accessed are exactly the same, adding
the binary version to a list on a match. If the match is not identical, that is if each offset in
the new version does not have exactly the same associated list of offsets as in the old version,
then a more fine-grained comparison is performed. In this case, duplicate offsets from each
register and pointer are removed in the old and new versions, and another literal comparison
is performed, adding the old version to a new (distinct from the "identical match" list) list
if it matches.
If this more focused comparison does not match, the stripped offset lists are then com-
pared on an access-by-access basis, checking if any of the accesses had the same offsets
referenced between versions. If any of the accesses match here, the list of matching accesses
is added to a third list along with the binary version.
The direct comparison of CFG data, along with three levels of access checks, leaves five
outcomes:
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1. Full fingerprint match, meaning the CFG and offset accesses were the same
2. Offset match with CFG change, meaning the offsets were the same but the code changed
3. Raw offset match, meaning the offsets were the same but their ordering and/or number
of accesses changed
4. Specific access match, meaning only a subset of accesses in the list matched
5. No matches, meaning the CFG changed and no previously found offsets were matched
This presentation of results quickly tells investigators if their tools will work as intended
or if a change is needed. It also informs developers as to which action(s) must be taken to
support the new version.
Outcome 1) requires no changes to the framework, 2) and 5) indicate that the targeted
function should be re-analyzed to ensure consistency of extracted artifacts, 3) generally
occurs as a result of compiler code re-ordering between versions and does not require re-
analyzing the function, and 4) requires re-analysis only if offsets relevant to the framework
have changed.
3.2.4 Things Left Behind
The automatic binary analysis capabilities of Seance allow investigators to quickly and easily
determine if a memory analysis framework supports a specific version of a particular binary.
Seance’s analysis describe accesses to a particular offset or set of offsets which are not brittle
to instruction changes, register changes, or even substantial compiler code re-ordering, as
Seance’s analysis is driven at a higher level, through symbolic execution. Overall, these
features will allow for a significant shift in the reliability and speed in which memory analysis
frameworks can support a wide range of operating system and application versions. The next
section details how all of these capabilities were leveraged to analyze forensically important
binaries for both macOS and Windows.
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3.3 Conversations with Dead People
3.3.1 Objective C Runtime
The first full evaluation of Seance was conducted against the Objective-C runtime. This
was chosen as a target for several reasons, including that is commonly abused by malware
on macOS systems, its sole previous research effort is largely outdated, and that it is open
source.
In 2016, a paper was published at DFRWS that documented memory forensic algorithms
for detecting the Crisis malware and its abuse of the Objective-C runtime [19]. This was
accomplished through enumeration of Objective-C classes and data loaded into a process
followed by checking for signs of malicious activity. This work only targeted macOS version
10.9, however, which stopped being supported in 2016 by Apple and is now six major OS
versions of out date. Attempting to integrate this data structure and algorithm data into
a new Volatility plugin to operate on the latest Objective C versions resulted in incorrect
results.
The memory forensics community as a whole faces similar issues with applications and
modules across a number of other operating systems. As manual compatibility checking is
clearly unworkable in the face of the sheer scale of this problem, it was decided that an
automated system for determining version compatibility of memory forensic algorithms was
needed, and, hence, Seance was born.
Targeted Data Structures
The goal for revamping Objective-C analysis was to be able to gather all loaded classes in
a process address space followed by the enumeration of instance variables and methods for
each class. This information allows for the enumeration of active instances of each class
and the decoding of variable values. Table 3.1 lists the structures and members needed to
accomplish this, along with the functions that reference each member.
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The testing was conducted using versions of the Objective-C runtime corresponding to
macOS versions 10.11.0 through 10.15.6. To gather the versions needed for testing,
libobjc.dylib was first extracted from each of these macOS versions. These files were then
de-duplicated based on the SHA1 hash of the library and stored which Objective-C versions
mapped to each hash. In total, this set was comprised of 21 different files.
Methodology
In an attempt to simulate a realistic investigative scenario in testing, a Seance database
was constructed from a selection of fourteen of the files, as described in Section 3.2.4. To
construct a database that might reflect the experiences of a seasoned investigator, more
files were included in the database than not, and since investigators do not typically get
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to choose which machines they analyze, random chance was used to select which files were
included. Once the database was constructed, each of the files left out of the database, the
experimental group, were compared against the database as described in Section 3.2.4 for
each of the target functions.
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To analyse the results, the differences detected were first compared to the chronology of the
files. As expected, files which Seance registered as identical matches or identical matches with
a CFG change for a given function, formed contiguous groups across Objective-C versions.
For example, NXFreeHashTable generated exact matches on three distinct groups of
files, 10.13.0 - 10.14.3, 10.14.4 - 10.14.6, and 10.15.0 - 10.15.6 whereas NXEmptyHashTable
generated matches for only one large grouping, 10.14.0 - 10.15.6. In contrast, in the relaxed
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mode where only the parameter of interest is matched, then NXEmptyHashTable matches on
every file tested.
Similarly, NXResetHashTable matches usage of the first parameter for all versions except
10.13.0-10.13.3, which correspond to exactly one of our test files. method_getName does not
generate any additional matches under these relaxed conditions, but even with exact match
enabled, only has two variants. The first covers 10.11.0 - 10.15.3 and the second 10.15.4 -
10.15.6. Interestingly, only the object_getClass function actually changes its CFG without
using the parameters differently. This highlights the importance of CFG matching, since an
investigator must check that the data structure is still used in the same way under the new
algorithm.
One particular function, removeSubclass, did not produce any exact matches, only
parameter matches, but these, too, coincided with temporal boundaries. However, in this
case, a pattern was not readily apparent just by looking at the results file, and required source
code analysis to make sense of the differences. A more concise, and detailed, breakdown of
the results is presented in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
This brings us to the second stage of our analysis, where the source code corresponding
to each file was examined to verify the changes reported by Seance. In this stage it was
discovered that in most cases when Seance detected changes in offset or CFG, there was
no corresponding change to the function’s source code. The exceptions to this were the
functions object_getClass and removeSubclass. In the source file objc-object.h, the
inlined function getIsa, which object_getClass uses, was substantially changed between
OSX versions 10.11.6 and 10.12.0, and again between 10.14.6 and 10.15.0. Similarly, in the
source file objc-runtime-new.mm, the function removeSubclass underwent major revisions
between OSX versions 10.14.3 and 10.14.4, and again between 10.14.6 and 10.15.0. Finally,
to verify the temporal boundaries where there was no source code change, disassemblies of
the functions NXEmptyHashTable, NXFreeHashTable, and NXResetHashTable, where Seance
detected changes but source code analysis revealed nothing, were examined. In each of
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these cases, semantically meaningful differences in the assembly instructions were discovered.
These differences could be the result to changes in the header files, compiler options, or
compilation tool chain used.
In studying the source code corresponding to material changes reported by Seance, it
was found that the algorithm to collect the variables and methods belonging to a class had
substantially changed in Objective-C for macOS 10.15.0. In particular, the bits member
(accessed by the removeSubclass function), which previously pointed to a class_rw_t
structure, could now point to either a class_rw_t or a class_ro_t depending on the class’
state. Furthermore, the class_rw_t structure itself had been broken into two separate
structures. This discovery illustrates the need for data structure layout extraction processes
to not only find the correct offset, but also to verify the operations performed on the offset.
In this situation, the bits member is used across versions, but the type it references has
changed in such a drastic manner that just knowing its offset is not enough to correctly
recover artifacts. Seance pointed directly to this discrepancy.
Analysis Conclusions
The evaluation of Objective-C has demonstrated that Seance is capable of analyzing a wide
variety of versions of a real-world library. Source code analysis was initially used to derive
the function list for Seance to analyze to find members, while the rest of the process was
automated. The results of this automated processing highlighted new structure offsets across
versions, as well as where just updating a structure’s offset would not be enough to accurately
support analysis. This evaluation also pointed out the pitfalls of source code-only review,
including that substantial changes can happen in the compiled form, as well as the downsides
of data structure layout extraction workflows that only examine changes in offsets.
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3.3.2 Evaluation - Windows Networking Stack
Analysis of the data structures of the Windows networking stack provides extremely valu-
able artifacts during an investigation. Through this analysis, an investigator can uncover all
listening sockets and connections, network interfaces in promiscuous mode, and can map net-
work activity to the process responsible for it. These data structures also contain timestamps
that indicate when specific activities started and/or ended.
As incident response investigations often start as a result of a network indicator, such
as a system contacting a known-bad IP address or resolving a known-bad hostname, it
is a significant advantage if the investigator can quickly determine which processes were
responsible for the malicious behaviour. Importantly, uncovering the connection creation
time allows including recovered connections into investigative timelines.
Unfortunately, history has shown that key parts of these data structures vary greatly be-
tween tcpip.sys versions and that frameworks have not kept up with the changes. Browsing
the Volatility 2 and Rekall issue trackers finds over twenty tickets related to connections not
being reported or key metadata, particularly a connection’s create time and owning process,
not being reported correctly.
Knowing the importance of recovering network activity from memory samples, Seance
was leveraged to widen the support of tcpip.sys versions in Volatility.
Targeted Data Structures
For this evaluation, the TCP_ENDPOINT data structure was targeted. This structure
holds the creation time, owning process, state, address family, and local and remote IP
address and port for each connection. Figure 3.2 displays this structure and its related-
structures as defined by Volatility for the base version of Windows 10. As illustrated in the
figure, TCP_ENDPOINT holds the state, port information, owner, and create time information
directly in the structure. Recovery of the address family and remote and local IP addresses
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requires use of the related structures.
Figure 3.2 Data structures for recovering network connections
To support analysis with Seance, functions inside of tcpip.sys that accessed these mem-
bers needed to be determined. To start this process, a ground truth was generated of the
TCP_ENDPOINT structure layout for particular versions. To accomplish this, a two-step ap-
proach was taken. First, the source code of Volatility 2 and, later, Volatility 3, was exmined
to determine the versions for which they had TCP_ENDPOINT defined. For Volatility 2, anal-
ysis showed that the entire structure was defined for the base versions of Windows 10 and
that the Owner field was updated for version 15063. No other version had updated offsets
for any members.
When analyzing Volatility 3, it was initially found that there was no support. Later,
though, it was discovered that there was a very recent effort, beginning in December 2020,
to bring support to Volatility 3. From a review of this effort, the structures appear accurate
from version 15063 through version 19041, but there is no support for 20H2 or for the pre-2017
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Windows 10 versions. It was also noted that the JSON files containing the structure layouts
include a comment that they were created by hand. Furthermore, a few related commits
indicating the structure layouts were incorrect were discovered. This is not surprising, as
manual creation of complicated structure layouts is currently a very difficult, labor-intensive
task. Eliminating this manual, error-prone process was a key motivating factor for this
research.
Once the offsets used by Volatility 2 and 3 were obtained, an intensive binary analysis
effort against tcpip.sys was undertaken to discover functions that reference the needed
structure offsets. Given the complexity of tcpip.sys, this was a non-trival task. Analysis
initially revealed that the State member is referenced in TcpCanTcbSend, but later testing
with Seance revealed that a different function was needed to support Windows 10 version
20H2. This is discussed further in Section 3.3.2. It was also determined that the Owner and
CreateTime fields are accessed in TcpCreateAndConnectTcb, and that all remaining fields
are accessed in TcpConnectTimeout.
It was also found that the checks for all members, except State and CreateTime, could
be strengthened by using the advanced specification (the list of internal function calls to
target, discussed in 3.2) features of Seance. For the Owner member, it was discovered
that it was populated through a call to InetGetClientProcess. This function returns
a pointer to the _EPROCESS structure of the process responsible for creating the connec-
tion. The disassembly of this flow is shown in Figure 3.3. Note that the rax register
is used as the return address of 64-bit function calls. To ensure that the time value is
always populated, InetGetClientProcess was included as a function call to find inside
TcpCreateandConnectTcb.
For the members that track the address family and local and remote IP addresses
and ports, a calling function specification was created. In particular, during examina-
tion of TcpConnectTimeout it was found that these members are passed as parameters to
InetFormatSockAddrAtDispathLevel and InetFormatLocalSockAddrAtDispatchLevel.
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These functions are responsible for creating sockaddr_in structures based on the param-
eters sent. Figure 3.4 shows commented disassembly of how each member is prepared be-
fore both function calls. This allowed for a specification of a function parameter check for
TcpConnectTimeout.










Figure 3.3 Owner being assigned from InetGetClientProcess
Versions Tested
To ensure that this effort covered a substantial variety of modern Windows versions, every
major 64-bit Windows 10 version released to date was tested. Table 3.5 provides the OS
version and corresponding build numbers covered during testing. Note that this data set
covers versions going back to the year 2016 through the latest release as of January, 2021.
82
Figure 3.4 Several members being accessed from TcpConnectTimeout













To begin the testing process, a Seance database for Windows 10 version 17134 was first
created. Then, a comparison between the generated database and the information within
Volatility 3 was performed. A Volatility 3 plugin was run to ensure connection structures
were recovered, along with their complete metadata. Once the data found during binary
analysis efforts, Volatility source code review, and Volatility plugin testing was confirmed to
be accurate, this was then used as a comparison point for databases generated against all of
the tcpip.sys versions.
Creating the databases for tcpip.sys required a few extra steps, as compared to the
Objective-C dylibs. First, the PDB files for each version under analysis were required, as
opposed to just the binaries. Additionally, the symbol address and names were needed in a
parseable format. To accomplish this pdbparse, an open-source tool that can both download
and export symbol information, was used, as mentioned in 3.2. Once the symbol information
was available, angr could then be provided with the offsets of symbols needed for analysis.
Analysis Results
Analysis revealed several interesting insights. Initially, two issues with version 19042 were
observed. First, Seance reported that the symbol chosen for recovering the TCP state,
TcpCanTcbSend, did not exist in the PDB. Manual examination of the pdbparse output
confirmed this. This required re-analysis of tcpip.sys to find a function present in 19042
that accessed the offset. Subsequent binary analysis found this access in TcpComputeRtoTcb.
The second issue reported was a material CFG change when attempting to recover the
CreateTime member. This occurred as all previous versions acquired the time by deref-
erencing the value at the hardcoded address 0xFFFFF78000000014. This address is not
documented by Microsoft, but analyzing cross-references to it gives a strong indication that
it is the current system time. Starting with 19042, it was found that the creation time of
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connections is instead calculated by calling the KeQuerySystemTimePrecise function. This
significant change is what triggered the Seance report.
Looking at the results as a whole, it was found that the offsets of members for tracking
the connection state, family, and remote and local IP addresses and ports did not change in
any version. It was also noted that these members are near the beginning of the structure.
Additionally, it was found that the CreateTime and Owner offsets changed for every version
analyzed, but that the offset between the two was always 16 bytes.
Analysis Conclusions
The analysis of tcpip.sys showed that, even though the driver is extremely complex, Seance
is able to automatically calculate and report both the offsets used to access particular mem-
bers as well as detect material changes that require manual review. In total, only two changes
were required for how particular offsets are calculated compared to the initially generated
database - the State and Owner members in version 20H2, as previously described. Fur-
thermore, the necessity for these two changes was automatically detected and reported by
Seance.
3.4 Related Work
3.4.1 Data Structure Reconstruction
For the same reasons that motivated this work, there has been significant interest in the
recovery of the data structure layout of executable modules analyzed during memory analysis
investigations.
Linux Kernel Analysis
Previously, [18] described an effort that recovered the offset of several data structure members
needed for analysis of Linux processes. This work was groundbreaking, but the techniques
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that were used are fragile, since instead of performing full binary analysis, pattern matching
was used against the disassembly of functions that access members of interest in a structure.
As described in the paper, this approach can only support a limited range of kernel versions.
A very closely-related approach to reconstruct a subset of Linux kernel data structure layouts
is taken in [140].
In [117], members of the Rekall development team added support for automatic profile
generation from live Linux systems. Prior efforts required the installation of compiler tools on
target systems, along with other dependencies. This has obvious negative forensic impacts,
so removing that requirement was desirable. Their approach involved pre-compiling abstract
syntax trees for mainline kernel versions followed by runtime refinement based on the con-
figuration of the kernel being analyzed. This allowed creation of Rekall profiles capable of
analyzing live systems without the need for compiler tools on the target system.
Additionally, [102] describes a system to automatically build Volatility profiles for analysis
of Linux memory samples. This project uses a custom Clang plugin to generate kernel source
code information and then uses angr to perform symbolic execution against functions in a
memory sample. The analysis of these functions reveals the offset of structure members.
angr is the standard open source framework for binary analysis, and as discussed in 3.2, is
used in Seance as well. This project differs from Seance in key ways though, including 1) it
requires the source code of the target module and 2) it is unable to internally detect when
its view of a data structure layout is incorrect. The authors also document several instances
where Volatility plugins do not produce correct artifacts when using profiles built with their
system.
Windows Kernel Analysis
Initial approaches to analysis of Windows memory samples relied on the debugging informa-
tion of the kernel executable provided by Microsoft [104, 99]. This debugging information
is contained within per-executable-version PDB files hosted on Microsoft’s symbol server.
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For kernel executables, the PDB will contain the address of all global symbols as well as
the layout of each data structure. This satisfies the requirements necessary for structured
analysis. As noted in several places, however, there are critical memory artifacts that are
not contained within the base kernel module [75, 29, 100]. Most notably are those of associ-
ated with the GUI subsystem (win32k*.sys), the network stack (tcpip.sys), and the web
server stack (HTTP.sys). For the network and web server stack, the released PDB files have
only ever contained the address of global symbols. For the GUI subsystem, PDBs with data
structures included were released for a small number of Windows 7 versions, while the rest
have only included symbol addresses. These gaps have led to the requirement for significant,
manual reverse engineering efforts on the part of memory analysis framework developers.
An approach to solving this issue was documented in [29]. It aimed to add support for
a wide range of win32k.sys versions within Rekall. The approach taken was to determine,
through manual analysis, which functions referenced members of data structures needed for
analysis to succeed. The result was the creation of template files that encode the instructions
used to access a particular structure member [126]. To provide a degree of flexibility, the
template format wildcards the offsets of control flow redirecting instructions as well as the
particular general-purpose register used to store and manipulate values. Unfortunately, this
approach is limited in several key ways. First, as noted in the paper, the templates are
fragile when it comes to changes in the compiled instruction flow. While more flexible
than work before it, the templates require the specific sequence of instructions leading to
a member access. This reduces usability across versions of a module, as these frequently
change. Second, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, not all accesses to needed structure members
occur in the beginning of a function or within a relatively small function. Since the templates
require the specific ordering of instructions leading to an access (post-branch unrolling), they
are fragile relative to the template’s size.
To alleviate the issues of instruction matching, Seance employs advanced binary analysis
that understands the semantics of structure member accesses. This allows it to determine
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both if the analyzed function has substantial changes between versions as well as if the
needed member offset(s) have changed.
Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a technique for memory analysis of virtual machine
guests from the host. To perform this analysis, VMI software must meet the same require-
ments as traditional structured memory analysis software. Popular VMI methods to obtain
data structure layouts, or to avoid the issue completely, include graph-based analysis, ma-
chine learning, and code-reuse [56, 44, 69, 111, 45, 38]. Unfortunately, none of these solve
the current problems of memory analysis frameworks as the approaches either require source
code access or they simply borrow and/or re-execute running code inside of a guest to extract
information from an API.
3.4.2 Program Analysis in Security
Program analysis, and specifically binary analysis, has long been a focus of security research,
primarily for malware analysis and vulnerability discovery. Projects such as BitBlaze [118]
and angr [55, 116, 121, 115] provide platforms for performing these analysis types.
Automated Program Analysis
Polyglot [16], HookFinder [136], and Prospex [30] attempt to automate specific analysis
tasks. Polyglot focuses on reverse engineering message protocols, and HookFinder detects
and extracts malicious code hooks. These efforts most closely mirror this work, as Seance
also involved building on a general binary analysis platform to automate a specific task.
However, the goals and methods of these projects vastly differ from what is presented here.
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CFG Analysis
Analysis of control flow graphs (CFGs) is a common technique in malware analysis and
defensive security [97, 15, 23]. Common applications include comparing CFGs of two pieces
of code to determine similarity, and detection of deviation from a known-good CFG to detect
return-oriented programming (ROP) exploitation [26, 116]. These methods make use of a
variety of often sophisticated graph-theoretic techniques to compare CFGs. This work, on
the other hand, requires less intense heuristics as it seeks to detect any changes in the graphs
of interest, since these indicate a potentially breaking change to forensic tools. This is in
contrast to examining purposely malicious software, such as metamorphic malware, which
changes many aspects of its CFG between samples.
Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution has been used in numerous research efforts to automatically discover
vulnerabilities, generate patches, refine fuzzing efforts, and direct coverage of binary code
paths [17, 34, 130, 135, 95, 64, 121, 24, 131, 37, 61]. The power of symbolic execution
derives from its ability to automatically explore multiple (or all) code paths of a program.
Seance leverages symbolic execution to determine when material changes have occurred in a
function that will require a manual examination by investigators, but does not attempt to
advance the state of the art of symbolic execution.
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Chapter Four. Conclusion
Memory forensics is a field which is primarily motivated, driven, and explored by practitioners
working on real cases, where large financial stakes, personal safety, or national security may
be on the line. At the same time, an investigator’s ability to make sense of a memory image
relies on the internal workings of the operating system of the target computer, which can be
heavily influenced by academic advances in algorithm and data structure design or privacy
and security, and which the investigator may not even have access to the details of. Further
complicating the issue is the potential presence of malware on a system. While the idea of
"malware" is fairly broadly understood my many, it is in actuality a general and not very
well defined term which covers a wide array of behaviors which can be difficult to distinguish
from benign behaviors on any given system, leading investigators down deep rabbit holes to
try and determine if a computer has been compromised or not.
With the understanding that in memory forensics, the investigator is perhaps the most
crucial element, this work addresses several major investigative burdens commonly encoun-
tered in real world scenarios, and additionally presents advances in the tools and methods
available to memory forensic researchers and investigators. This was done in two parts:
firstly, two frameworks, HookTracer and the Seance API, were constructed, based on em-
ulation and symbolic execution, respectively. These frameworks bring powerful tools for
program analysis to memory forensics in broadly applicable and extensible ways. Secondly,
these frameworks were used to power four tools for addressing specific problems facing in-
vestigators. The Volatility plugins hooktracer, hooktracer_messagehooks, and iodine, built
on top of HookTracer, help investigators discover malicious behavior on infected systems by
exploring the behaviors of API hooks, message hooks, and injected shellcode, respectively.
The fourth tool, Seance, automatically discovers changes how given data structures are ac-
cessed across different versions of the same binary. Updates to data structures have long
plagued forensic tool maintainers, often requiring them to manually reverse engineer bina-
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ries, or at least review source code, whenever a new version of relevant software is released.
The suite of Volatility plugins were used to successfully identify, and single out, malicious
behavior and infected processes on computers infected with several different varieties of mal-
ware, including Rovnix, Stuxnet, TDSS, and Zeus, with little to no work on the end of the
investigator, aside from running the plugin to gather the data, and running the plugin to
analyze it. Seance successfully identified every case where a forensic tool would need to be
updated, and, importantly, when it could be left alone, when handle binaries in both the
Objective C runtime and in the Windows Kernel, for several different data structures.
4.1 Here Be Dragons
This work opens up several interesting and exciting avenues for future research. As noted
in Section 2.3.4, certain malicious behaviors can depend on specific inputs (e.g., looking for
something that looks like a Bitcoin public key in a copy and paste buffer before overwriting
that buffer [28]), or orders of actions, and as such can be hard to detect with just emula-
tion. In these cases, it seems that a symbolic execution engine could be used in place of
HookTracer’s Unicorn emulator to achieve better results, in terms of code paths explored
and behavior revealed. Planned future work will attempt just this, by leveraging the Seance
API with similar goals to those of hooktracer, hooktracer_messagehooks, and iodine. The
hurdles currently identified are getting process memory into a state usable by angr (process
memory is several gigabytes in size, too large for angr to handle), and Volatility compati-
bility. Volatility 2, the version used in this work, works exclusively with Python 2, which
is no longer supported, while angr works only with Python 3. This means Seance cannot
be integrated as part of a Volatility 2 plugin, as it currently stands. However, Volatility 3
(which uses Python 3) was recently released for public use, and, once it is in a more stable
state, should remedy this issue.
Another future project also involves Volatility. As it stands, Seance detects changes
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correctly, but only gives an indication that something changed, and still requires investigation
if this is the case, no matter how small the discrepancy. Planned future work will attempt
to integrate support for automatically detecting changes which require simple or expected
updates to offsets, and automatically patching Volatility’s vtypes, data structures inside
Volatility which hold the information on how important forensic data structures are laid
out, with these updates.
Lastly, with each of the new Volatility plugins instrumenting code, they provide a po-
tential vector for extracting features of the emulated code. By re-configuring HookTracer,
or perhaps Seance, to emit data in a way useful to machine learning algorithms, it may be
possible to design machine learning-assisted tools for use in the investigative workflow for
use in analysing code hooks or injected code.
4.2 Closing Remarks
At the time of writing, all of the work presented here has either been published (hooktracer
[20], hooktracer_messagehooks [21]), under peer review (Seance), or is in the process of being
written into a paper (iodine). The code used in the projects is currently being reviewed and
cleaned up, but will be publicly available on GitHub, with instructions for use, once this is
finished. Likely, this will be done under two separate repositories (HookTracer and Seance).
Lastly, special thanks to all of the open source projects and developers which made this work
possible, especially those involved with angr [55], Unicorn [108], and Volatility [128].
92
Appendix A: Publishing Agreements
93
94
Copyright agreement for "HookTracer: A System for Automated and Accessible





Copyright agreement for "Hooktracer: Automatic Detection and Analysis of




[1] Monnappa K. A. Detecting Deceptive Hollowing Techniques. 2016. url: https : / /
cysinfo.com/detecting-deceptive-hollowing-techniques/.
[2] Irfan Ahmed and Golden G. Richard III. “Live Forensic Analysis of Kernel Code for
Malware Detection in Cloud Computing Environments”. In: Proceedings of the 65th
Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) (2013).
[3] Irfan Ahmed et al. “Integrity Checking of Function Pointers in Kernel Pools via Vir-
tual Machine Introspection”. In: Proceedings of the 16th Information Security Con-
ference (ISC 2013) (2013).
[4] Irfan Ahmed et al. “ModChecker: Kernel Module Integrity Checking in the Cloud
Environment”. In: Proceedings of CloudSec 2012: The International Workshop on Se-
curity in Cloud Computing (2012).
[5] Omar Alrawi et al. “Forecasting Malware Capabilities From Cyber Attack Memory
Images”. In: 30th USENIX Security Symposium (2021).
[6] b33f. PowerShell-Suite. 2016. url: https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-
Suite/blob/master/Masquerade-PEB.ps1.
[7] Elena Gabriela Barrantes et al. “Randomized Instruction Set Emulation to Disrupt
Binary Code Injection Attacks”. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security (2003), pp. 281–289.
[8] Daniel Bartholomew. “Qemu: AMulti-host, Multi-target Emulator”. In: Linux Journal
2006.145 (2006), p. 3.
[9] Michael Becher, Maximillian Dornseif, and Christian N Klein. “FireWire: all your
memory are belong to us”. In: Proceedings of CanSecWest (2005), p. 67.
[10] Fabrice Bellard. “QEMU, a Fast and Portable Dynamic Translator”. In: (2005).
[11] Michael Bilzor et al. “Security Checkers: Detecting Processor Malicious Inclusions at
Runtime”. In: 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security
and Trust (2011), pp. 34–39.
[12] Lutz Böhne. “Pandora’s Bochs: Automatic Unpacking of Malware”. In: University of
Mannheim (2008).
[13] Jurriaan Bremer. x86 API Hooking Demystified. 2012. url: https://jbremer.org/x86-
api-hooking-demystified/.
[14] Gianluca Brindisi. gozi-isfb. 2016. url: https://github.com/gbrindisi/malware/tree/
master/windows/gozi-isfb.
100
[15] Danilo Bruschi, Lorenzo Martignoni, and Mattia Monga. “Detecting Self-Mutating
Malware Using Control-Flow Graph Matching”. In: International conference on detec-
tion of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment. Springer. 2006, pp. 129–
143.
[16] Juan Caballero and Dawn Song. “Polyglot: Automatic Extraction of Protocol Format
using Dynamic Binary Analysis”. In: Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on
Computer and and Communications Security (CCS’07). 2007.
[17] Cristian Cadar et al. “EXE: Automatically Generating Inputs of Death”. In: CCS ’06:
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2006, pp. 322–335. isbn: 1-59593-518-5.
[18] Andrew Case, Lodovico Marziale, and Golden G. Richard III. “Dynamic Recreation of
Kernel Data Structures for Live Forensics”. In: Proceedings of the 10th Annual Digital
Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) (2010).
[19] Andrew Case and Golden G. Richard III. “Detecting Objective-C Malware Through
Memory Forensics”. In: Proceedings of the 16th Annual Digital Forensics Research
Workshop (DFRWS) (2016).
[20] Andrew Case et al. “HookTracer: A System for Automated and Accessible API Hooks
Analysis”. In: Digital Investigation 29 (2019), S104–S112.
[21] Andrew Case et al. “HookTracer: Automatic Detection and Analysis of Keystroke
Loggers Using Memory Forensics”. In: (2020).
[22] Catalin Cimpanu. Russia’s Elite Hacking Unit Has Been Silent, But Busy. 2018.
url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/russias-elite-hacking-unit-has-been-silent-but-
busy/.
[23] Silvio Cesare and Yang Xiang. “Classification of Malware Using Structured Control
Flow”. In: Proceedings of the Eighth Australasian Symposium on Parallel and Dis-
tributed Computing-Volume 107. 2010, pp. 61–70.
[24] Ting Chen et al. “State of the Art: Dynamic Symbolic Execution for Automated Test
Generation”. In: Future Generation Computer Systems 29.7 (2013), pp. 1758–1773.
[25] Xu Chen et al. “Towards an understanding of anti-virtualization and anti-debugging
behavior in modern malware”. In: 2008 IEEE international conference on dependable
systems and networks with FTCS and DCC (DSN) (2008), pp. 177–186.
[26] Yueqiang Cheng et al. “ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach for Defending
Against ROP Attack”. In: Internet Society (2014).
[27] Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. “Static analysis for security”. In: IEEE security &
privacy 2.6 (2004), pp. 76–79.
101
[28] Catalin Cimpanu. CryptoShuffler Stole $150,000 by Replacing Bitcoin Wallet IDs in
PC Clipboards. 2017. url: https : //www.bleepingcomputer . com/news/ security/
cryptoshuffler-stole-150-000-by-replacing-bitcoin-wallet-ids-in-pc-clipboards/.
[29] Michael I. Cohen. “Characterization of the Windows Kernel Version Variability for
Accurate Memory Analysis”. In: Proceedings of the 2015 Digital Forensics Research
Workshop EU (DFRWS-EU) (2015).
[30] Paolo Milani Comparetti et al. “Prospex: Protocol specification extraction”. In: 2009
30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE. 2009, pp. 110–125.
[31] The MITRE Corporation. Technique: Timestomp. 2018. url: https://attack.mitre.
org/techniques/T1099/.
[32] The MITRE Corporation. Turla. 2018. url: https : / / attack .mitre . org / groups /
G0010/.
[33] Cuckoo Foundation. Cuckoo Sandbox Automated Malware Analysis. 2014-2019. url:
https://cuckoosandbox.org.
[34] Drew Davidson et al. “FIE on Firmware: Finding Vulnerabilities in Embedded Sys-
tems Using Symbolic Execution”. In: 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 13). Washington, D.C.: USENIX Association, Aug. 2013, pp. 463–478. isbn:
978-1-931971-03-4.
[35] Benjamin Delpy. mimikatz. url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz.
[36] Brendan Dolan-Gavitt. pdbparse. https://github.com/moyix/pdbparse.
[37] Brendan Dolan-Gavitt et al. “LAVA: Large-Scale Automated Vulnerability Addition”.
In: 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 2016, pp. 110–121.
[38] Brendan Dolan-Gavitt et al. “Virtuoso: Narrowing the Semantic Gap in Virtual Ma-
chine Introspection”. In: 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE. 2011,
pp. 297–312.
[39] Edward J. Schwartz and Thanassis Avgerinos and David Brumley. “All You Ever
Wanted to Know about Dynamic Taint Analysis and Forward Symbolic Execution
(but Might Have Been Afraid to Ask)”. In: 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. 2010, pp. 317–331.
[40] Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien. “W32. Stuxnet Dossier”. In: White
paper, Symantec Corp., Security Response (2011).
[41] FireEye. FakeNet-NG-Next Generation Dynamic Network Analysis Tool. 2016. url:
https://github.com/fireeye/flare-fakenet-ng.
102
[42] Adrea Fortuna. Malware VM detection techniques evolving: an analysis of Gravi-
tyRAT. 2018. url: https : //www.andreafortuna .org/2018/05/21/malware - vm-
detection-techniques-evolving-an-analysis-of-gravityrat/.
[43] The Raspberry Pi Foundation. Raspbian. url: https : / / www . raspberrypi . org /
downloads/raspbian/.
[44] Yangchun Fu and Zhiqiang Lin. “Space Traveling Across VM: Automatically Bridging
the Semantic Gap in Virtual Machine Introspection via Online Kernel Data Redirec-
tion”. In: 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE. 2012, pp. 586–600.
[45] Yangchun Fu, Junyuan Zeng, and Zhiqiang Lin. “HYPERSHELL: A Practical Hyper-
visor Layer Guest OS Shell for Automated In-VM Management”. In: 2014 USENIX
Annual Technical Conference. 2014, pp. 85–96.
[46] Simson L. Garfinkel. “Carving Contiguous and Fragmented Files with Fast Object
Validation”. In: Digital Forensics Research Conference (DFRWS) (2007), pp. 71–77.
[47] Google. Rekall. https://github.com/google/rekall. 2016.
[48] Mariano Graziano, Davide Balzarotti, and Alain Zidouemba. “ROPMEMU: A Frame-
work for the Analysis of Complex Code-reuse Attacks”. In: ASIACCS 2016, 11th ACM
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, May 30-June 3, 2016,
Xi’ian, China. 2016. url: http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/4838.
[49] Nikolay Grebennikov. Keyloggers: Implementing Keyloggers in Windows. Part Two.
2011. url: https://securelist.com/keyloggers-implementing-keyloggers-in-windows-
part-two/36358.
[50] Michael Gruhn and Felix C Freiling. “Evaluating atomicity, and integrity of correct
memory acquisition methods”. In: Digital Investigation 16 (2016), S1–S10.
[51] Jun Gu et al. Algorithms for the Satisfiability (SAT) Problem: A Survey. Tech. rep.
Cincinnati Univ oh Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 1996.
[52] J Alex Halderman et al. “Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys”.
In: Communications of the ACM 52.5 (2009), pp. 91–98.
[53] Andrew Honig et al. FakeNet. 2012. url: https ://practicalmalwareanalysis . com/
fakenet/.
[54] Ashkan Hosseini. Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common





[56] Hajime Inoue et al. “Automatically Bridging the Semantic Gap Using C Interpreter”.
In: Proc. of the 2011 Annual Symposium on Information Assurance. 2011, pp. 51–58.
[57] Dell Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. “Skeleton Key Malware
Analysis”. In: (2015).
[58] Microsoft Security Intelligence. Win32/Rovnix. 2014. url: https://www.microsoft.
com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Win32/Rovnix.
[59] IOActive. Reversal and Analysis of Zeus and SpyEye Banking Trojans. 2012. url:
https://ioactive.com/pdfs/ZeusSpyEyeBankingTrojanAnalysis.pdf.
[60] Salman Javaid et al. “Atomizer: A Fast, Scalable and Lightweight Heap Analyzer
for Virtual Machines in a Cloud Environment”. In: Proceedings of the 6th Layered
Assurance Workshop (LAW’12) (2012).
[61] Junfeng Yang et al. “Automatically Generating Malicious Disks Using Symbolic Ex-
ecution”. In: 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S P’06). 2006, 15 pp.–
257.
[62] Min Gyung Kang et al. “Emulating Emulation-resistant Malware”. In: VMSec ’09
(2009), pp. 11–22.
[63] William B Kimball and Rusty O Baldwin. Emulation-based Software Protection. US
Patent 8,285,987. Oct. 2012.
[64] Clemens Kolbitsch et al. “Rozzle: De-cloaking Internet Malware”. In: 2012 IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy. 2012, pp. 443–457. doi: 10.1109/SP.2012.48.
[65] Jesse Kornblum. “Identifying almost identical files using context triggered piecewise
hashing”. In: Digital investigation 3 (2006), pp. 91–97.
[66] Brian Krebs. Carberp Code Leak Stokes Copycat Fears. 2013. url: https://krebsonsecurity.
com/2013/06/carberp-code-leak-stokes-copycat-fears/.
[67] Brian Krebs.U.S. Government Takes Down Coreflood Botnet. url: https://krebsonsecurity.
com/2011/04/u-s-government-takes-down-coreflood-botnet/.
[68] Christopher Kruegel. “Full System Emulation: Achieving Successful Automated Dy-
namic Analysis of Evasive Malware”. In: Proc. BlackHat USA Security Conference.
2014, pp. 1–7.
[69] Ajay Kumara and CD Jaidhar. “Automated Multi-Level Malware Detection System
Based on Reconstructed Semantic View of Executables Using Machine Learning Tech-
niques at VMM”. In: Future Generation Computer Systems 79 (2018), pp. 431–446.
[70] Kaspersky Lab. The Epic Turla (Snake/Uroburos) Attacks. 2019. url: https://usa.
kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats/epic-turla-snake-malware-attacks.
104
[71] Kevin P Lawton. “Bochs: A Portable PC Emulator for Unix/X”. In: Linux Journal
(1996).
[72] LibVMI Virtual Machine Introspection. url: http://libvmi.com/.
[73] Michael Hale Ligh. MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsys-
tem. 2012. url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-
malware-hooks-in.html.
[74] Michael Hale Ligh et al. Malware Analyst’s Cookbook and DVD: Tools and Techniques
for Fighting Malicious Code. Wiley Publishing, 2010.
[75] Michael Hale Ligh et al. The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats
in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. New York: Wiley, 2014.
[76] MalBot. Post 0x17.1: Analyzing Turla’s Keylogger. 2018. url: https://malware.news/
t/post-0x17-1-analyzing-turla-s-keylogger/22762.
[77] MalBot. Post 0x17.2: Analyzing Turla’s Keylogger. 2018. url: https://malware.news/
t/post-0x17-2-analyzing-turla-s-keylogger/23334.
[78] David Maloney. Return Oriented Programming (ROP) Exploits Explained. rapid7.
2016. url: https://www.rapid7.com/resources/rop-exploit-explained/.
[79] Malpedia. Loki Password Stealer (PWS). 2019. url: https ://malpedia .caad. fkie .
fraunhofer.de/details/win.lokipws.
[80] Microsoft. CreateToolhelp32Snapshot function. 2018. url: https ://docs .microsoft .
com/en-us/windows/win32/api/tlhelp32/nf-tlhelp32-createtoolhelp32snapshot.
[81] Microsoft. FindFirstFile function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/
windows/win32/api/fileapi/nf-fileapi-findfirstfilea.
[82] Microsoft. FindNextFileA function. 2018. url: https : / / docs .microsoft . com/ en -
us/windows/win32/api/fileapi/nf-fileapi-findnextfilea.
[83] Microsoft. GetComputerNameA function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase- getcomputernamea?redirectedfrom=
MSDN.
[84] Microsoft. GetFileTime function. 2018. url: https ://docs .microsoft .com/en- us/
windows/win32/api/fileapi/nf-fileapi-getfiletime.
[85] Microsoft. GetModuleFileNameW function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/
en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-getmodulefilenamew.
[86] Microsoft. GetSystemTime function. 2018. url: https : //docs .microsoft . com/en-
us/windows/win32/api/sysinfoapi/nf-sysinfoapi-getsystemtime.
105
[87] Microsoft. KeyboardProc callback function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/
en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/ms644984(v%3Dvs.85).
[88] Microsoft. Process32First function. 2018. url: https : / / docs .microsoft . com/ en -
us/windows/win32/api/tlhelp32/nf-tlhelp32-process32first.
[89] Microsoft. Process32Next function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/
windows/win32/api/tlhelp32/nf-tlhelp32-process32next.
[90] Microsoft. SetFileTime function. 2018. url: https ://docs .microsoft . com/en- us/
windows/win32/api/fileapi/nf-fileapi-setfiletime.
[91] Microsoft. SetWindowsHookExA function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/win32/api/winuser/nf-winuser-setwindowshookexa.
[92] Microsoft. SystemTimeToFileTime function. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/
en-us/windows/win32/api/timezoneapi/nf-timezoneapi-systemtimetofiletime.
[93] Microsoft. ZwQueryInformationFile. 2019. url: https : //docs .microsoft . com/en -
us/windows-hardware/drivers/ddi/content/ntifs/nf-ntifs-ntqueryinformationfile.




[95] David Molnar, Xue Cong Li, and David A. Wagner. “Dynamic Test Generation to Find
Integer Bugs in X86 Binary Linux Programs”. In: Proceedings of the 18th Conference
on USENIX Security Symposium. SSYM’09. Montreal, Canada: USENIX Association,
2009, pp. 67–82.
[96] Matthew Muscat and Mark Vella. Enhancing Virtual Machine Introspection-Based
Memory Analysis with Event Triggers. 2018 IEEE International Conference on Cloud
Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom). 2018.
[97] Minh Hai Nguyen et al. “Auto-Detection of Sophisticated Malware Using Lazy-Binding
Control Flow Graph and Deep Learning”. In: Computers & Security 76 (2018), pp. 128–
155.
[98] nyx0. Carberp Banking Trojan. 2015. url: https://github.com/nyx0/Carberp.
[99] James Okolica and Gilbert L. Peterson. “Windows Operating System Agnostic Mem-
ory Analysis”. In: Proceedings of the 10th Annual Digital Forensics Research Workshop
(DFRWS) (2010).
[100] OMFW 2012: Malware In the Windows GUI Subsystem. https : / /volatility - labs .
blogspot.com/2012/10/omfw-2012-malware-in-windows-gui.html.
106
[101] OWASP. Fuzzing. https://owasp.org/www-community/Fuzzing.
[102] Fabio Pagani. “Advances in Memory Forensics”. PhD thesis. Sorbonne Université,
2019.
[103] Rob Pantazopoulos. Loki-Bot: Information Stealer, Keylogger, & More! 2017. url:
https://digital- forensics.sans.org/community/papers/grem/loki-bot- information-
stealer-keylogger-more_4802.
[104] Nick Petroni et al. “FATKit: A Framework for the Extraction and Analysis of Digital
Forensic Data from Volatile System Memory”. In: Digital Investigation 3.4 (2006).
[105] Matt Pietrek. An In-Depth Look into the Win32 Portable Executable File Format,
Part 2. 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/msdn-magazine/2002/
march/inside-windows-an- in-depth- look- into-the-win32-portable-executable-file-
format-part-2.
[106] Georgios Portokalidis, Asia Slowinska, and Herbert Bos. “Argos: An Emulator for
Fingerprinting Zero-day Attacks for Advertised Honeypots with Automatic Signature
Generation”. In: ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review. Vol. 40. 4. 2006, pp. 15–
27.
[107] Empire: Building an Empire with PowerShell. https://www.powershellempire.com.
2016.
[108] Nguyen Anh Quynh and Dang Hoang Vu. “Unicorn: Next Generation CPU Emulator
Framework”. In: Black Hat USA (2015).
[109] Ryan Dewhurst. Static Code Analysis. https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/
Static_Code_Analysis.
[110] AVAST Software s.r.o. AVG Anti-Virus Free. url: https://www.avg.com/en-us/free-
antivirus-download.
[111] Alireza Saberi, Yangchun Fu, and Zhiqiang Lin. “Hybrid-Bridge: Efficiently Bridging
the Semantic Gap in Virtual Machine Introspection via Decoupled Execution and
Training Memoization”. In: Proceedings of the 21st Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS’14). 2014.
[112] SecureWorks. Gozi Trojan. 2007. url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/gozi.
[113] Koushik Sen. “Concolic testing”. In: Proceedings of the twenty-second IEEE/ACM
international conference on Automated software engineering. 2007, pp. 571–572.
[114] SentinelOne. GozNym Banking Malware: Gang Busted, But Is That The End? 2019.
url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/goznym-banking-malware-gang-busted/.
107
[115] Yan Shoshitaishvili et al. “Firmalice - Automatic Detection of Authentication Bypass
Vulnerabilities in Binary Firmware”. In: NDSS. 2015.
[116] Yan Shoshitaishvili et al. “SoK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in
Binary Analysis”. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2016.
[117] Arkadiusz Socała and Michael Cohen. “Automatic Profile Generation for Live Linux
Memory Analysis”. In: Digital Investigation 16 (2016). DFRWS 2016 Europe, S11–
S24. issn: 1742-2876. url: http : / /www . sciencedirect . com/ science / article / pii /
S1742287616000050.
[118] Dawn Song et al. “BitBlaze: A New Approach to Computer Security via Binary
Analysis”. In: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Systems
Security. ICISS ’08. 2008.
[119] Sophos. Gozi V3: Tracked by Their Own Stealth. 2019. url: https://news.sophos.
com/en-us/2019/12/24/gozi-v3-tracked-by-their-own-stealth/.
[120] Sophos. Gozi V3: Tracked by Their Own Stealth. 2019. url: https://news.sophos.
com/en-us/2019/12/24/gozi-v3-tracked-by-their-own-stealth/.
[121] Nick Stephens et al. “Driller: Augmenting Fuzzing Through Selective Symbolic Exe-
cution”. In: NDSS. 2016.
[122] superponible. Volatility Plugin – SSDeep for malfind and apihooks. 2014. url: https:
//blog.superponible.com/2014/08/30/volatility- plugin- ssdeep- for-malfind- and-
apihooks/.
[123] Cisco Talos. ROPMEMU. 2016. url: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/ROPMEMU/.
[124] ASERT Team. Donot Team Leverages New Modular Malware Framework in South
Asia. 2018. url: https://de.netscout.com/blog/asert/donot-team-leverages-new-
modular-malware-framework-south-asia.
[125] FortiGuard SE Team. Newly Discovered Infostealer Attack Uses LokiBot. 2019. url:
https : / /www . fortinet . com/blog / threat - research /new - infostealer - attack - uses -
lokibot.html.
[126] The Rekall Team. undocumented.yaml. https : //github . com/google/ rekall /blob/
f6dd53607c8cb7a7468a2fe9a6ad6f677f71680f / src / profiles / win32k / undocumented .
yaml. 2014.
[127] Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. Platinum: Targeted Attacks in
South and Southeast Asia. 2016. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/
details.aspx?id=51956.
[128] The Volatility Framework: Volatile Memory Artifact Extraction Utility Framework.
2017. url: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility.
108
[129] Stefan Vömel and Felix C Freiling. “A survey of main memory acquisition and analysis
techniques for the windows operating system”. In: Digital Investigation 8.1 (2011),
pp. 3–22.
[130] Tielei Wang et al. “IntScope: Automatically Detecting Integer Overflow Vulnerability
in X86 Binary Using Symbolic Execution”. In: NDSS. 2009.
[131] Tielei Wang et al. “TaintScope: A Checksum-Aware Directed Fuzzing Tool for Auto-
matic Software Vulnerability Detection”. In: 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. 2010, pp. 497–512.
[132] Ian Wienand. PLT and GOT - the key to code sharing and dynamic libraries. 2011.
url: https://www.technovelty.org/linux/plt-and-got-the-key-to-code-sharing-and-
dynamic-libraries.html.
[133] Forensics Wiki. List of Volatility Plugins. 2012. url: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/
volatility/wiki/Command-Reference.
[134] James Wyke. “What is zeus?” In: Sophos, May (2011).
[135] Zhemin Yang et al. “AppIntent: Analyzing Sensitive Data Transmission in Android
for Privacy Leakage Detection”. In: CCS ’13. Berlin, Germany, 2013, pp. 1043–1054.
[136] Heng Yin, Zhenkai Liang, and Dawn Song. “HookFinder: Identifying and Understand-
ing Malware Hooking Behaviors”. In: (2008).
[137] Heng Yin and Dawn Song. “Temu: Binary Code Analysis via Whole-system Layered
Annotative Execution”. In: EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley,
Tech. Rep. UCB/EECS-2010-3 (2010).
[138] Katsunari Yoshioka et al. “Malware sandbox analysis for secure observation of vulner-
ability exploitation”. In: IEICE transactions on information and systems 92.5 (2009),
pp. 955–966.
[139] Michal Zalewski. American fuzzy lop (AFL) fuzzer. 2017.
[140] Shuhui Zhang, Xiangxu Meng, and Lianhai Wang. “An Adaptive Approach for Linux




Ryan Dominick Maggio was born in New Orleans, Louisiana. He graduated with his B.S. in
Mathematics, with a minor in Computer Science, from Louisiana State university in 2016.
His experiences with programming, as well as an exposure to the field of computer security,
led him to pursue his doctorate in Computer Science at Louisiana State University the
following year, with a focus on cybersecurity.
110
